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3 December 1991

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Daily Sees KGB in Slovak Independence Drive

92CH0133A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
4 Nov 91 pp 1, 8

[Article by Jan Subert: "Slovak 'Operation X'"]

[Text] When looking at Slovakia in recent weeks and days an image emerges of obvious political and economic destabilization. There are escalating numbers of more or less veiled speeches that begin with nationalism connected with a power struggle and end with a fear of entering an open Europe. This is all exacerbated by the undecipherable intertwining of domestic and obviously also foreign interests and influences. This means that any attempt to learn the truth about the current Slovak scene comes up with a number of hypotheses. We tried to confirm one of these hypotheses after consultations with several informed experts of our law enforcement services.

According to the ideas about which we wrote in early October in connection with events in Kosice, the Slovak postrevolutionary scene has from the beginning been the subject of an extensive intelligence game that the KGB had prepared as early as 1988, and which it unleashed immediately after 17 November. The objective of the game is to make impossible or at least to cause the maximum difficulties in cooperation between the former Soviet satellites, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, thus creating on the Eastern border of the Central Europe now being formed a chain of weak, internally divided countries. With this in mind Slovakia was not selected at random. It can be used to influence all three countries at once, and is therefore critical to the plan. Because this project involves interest groups from the old power structures in the socialist block that still retain their influence, the plan did not stop even after the failure of the Moscow coup.

At first glance, to be sure, this seems to be a pretty wild construction. There is no direct proof, and there may be completely different explanations for many strange events, all of which provide grist for the mill of the disintegrating federation. But is the proposed scenario really so infeasible? Many indicators say that it is not.

First of all it would be naive to think that an imperial empire that loses a strategically important colony will stand aside and allow its influence on global political changes to be diminished. The Soviet intelligence service, recently still a branch of the eliminated KGB, has immense experience running destabilization programs against political regimes. In the form of many active measures it successfully developed such projects in third world countries and, which is especially important, used the Czechoslovak intelligence service to great advantage, for example in Indonesia, Africa, and South America. Nor should the recent announcement be ignored that the former KGB head, Kryuchkov, was one of the chief organizers of the anti-Gorbachev coup.

The existence of intelligence operations, we will call them Operation X for lack of a different name, is indicated as well by the course and nature of various campaigns which in every case begin with disinformation. It has also been proven that projects on Slovak territory aiming directly or indirectly at the disintegration of the country have been participated in by former members of State Security, compromised former policemen, and members of the disbanded People's Militia.

Also of note is the position of the federal law enforcement and information services and the Ministry of the Interior [FMV], which neither confirm nor deny the existence of an Operation X. The frequent meetings between minister Langos and his Hungarian and Polish colleagues would indicate, on the contrary, that the FMV is undertaking specific countermeasures. We can, however, ask how such international steps might be complicated by Polish and Hungarian attitudes to the personnel staffing the intelligence and law enforcement services. In both countries, in contrast to what happened here, both services were retained, with only their mission statements changed. However, there is clearly a common interest for the participating sides. This is confirmed by the results of the recent meeting in Warsaw between the Polish, Hungarian, and our minister of the interior, the result of which was an agreement by all present on the necessity for completely reliable controls on their own intelligence services and for close coordination of future projects. They were in agreement in stating that their personal meetings and direct conversations will continue to be the most effective defense against efforts to disable a common strategy for entering democratic Europe.

Recently, serious suspicions have developed that the critical phase of the effort to create a destabilized Eastern zone, namely the declaration of an independent Slovakia, while an independent objective, is still in line with an interesting objective of the Papal throne. Informed sources, the reliability of which we have not been able to verify, have told us that the Vatican has put together a plan for the gradual shift of the main pillars of conservative Catholicism from the "ruined" West to the relatively virginal post-Communist countries. Slovakia has been designated to play an important role in this effort. This would go far in explaining the frequent visits of Slovak politicians to the Vatican and their peculiar behavior and speeches, for example the well-known rejection of liberalism. However, the dividing line between activities of the Vatican intelligence service and a "pure" destabilizing Operation X would be even more undecipherable.

The key to the actual truth about the influence of Soviet intelligence on the Slovak political scene, which is better described as a so-called active operation than as an intelligence game, lies in the station that the KGB maintained in our country. We cannot count on its being handed over to Czechoslovak offices, as has been indicated by the appropriate places in Moscow. The Soviet

Union, however, is not the only country that has information about KGB stations in Central Europe. This information is also available from the CIA and probably from the British MI-6. If, under the proper circumstances, the CIA could be convinced to make a gesture of friendship and break its silence vis a vis our intelligence service, we would potentially have more than one surprise.

Klaus: Civic Principle as Basis for Common State

92CH0150A Prague *ČESKY DENÍK* in Czech
15 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vaclav Klaus, Federal minister of finance: "Budgets and Common State"]

[Text] Although at first glance it may not be obvious to everyone, the ongoing debate about the budgets of the federation and of both our republics is a discussion about our common or noncommon state. Moreover, it has the advantage of making the heretofore "free" discussion about the common state more specific and more precisely focused.

The difficult drafting of this year's budgets has revealed to us the whole brutal truth that in our discussions of the constitutional system we followed from the very beginning a wrong path—first, we (perhaps not we) started to assign and redistribute our state's power-sharing rights, and only then we began searching for a definition of a fundamental idea for the unification of our common state. The correct way proceeds exactly in the opposite direction: First, we must define our common state and specify how we want it and what we as citizens expect from it. As soon as we agree on that approach to this whole issue, the powersharing rights of the federation and of the republics will ensue more or less logically and become evident to us. The power-sharing rights do not—and cannot—serve as the starting point for the definition of our common state. Just the opposite is true, they follow from it. I am afraid that we cannot accomplish anything at all if we create the concept of our common state while being constrained by powersharing rights that stem from a nebulous and inconsistent notion and that have already been divided in advance.

What used to exist here under the communist system was not a common state in the true sense of that word, because we may say, albeit with some exaggeration, that all we used to have in common was our bondage. The communist nomenklatura did not regard the relations among our republics and nations as important, and therefore, they were obfuscated and distorted in many ways. It is only now that we intend to create a genuine common state and must choose the principle on which we shall build it. I am absolutely certain that a democratic and prosperous state can be based on a single principle—on the civic principle, a principle that assumes that people consider themselves citizens first, i.e., free individuals who create their own state in their own image and who are primarily interested in creating

a state that will respect them and safeguard their freedoms. If we opt for any other principle as our constitutional principle, for instance, the national principle which makes everyone feel first and foremost as a Czech, a Slovak, a Hungarian, or a Gypsy, and only then as a citizen, we shall create a state of closed groups whose mutual relations will be marked mainly by squabbling, suspicions and intolerance—a state that cannot very well become either democratic or prosperous.

If we adopt the civic principle, it will have several consequences for our state budgets as well. As regards the budgets of our republics, in agreement with the general trend of our reforms, we cannot ignore the fact that their expenditures will not match the ratio given by the number of the citizens in both republics (1.95:1), but rather a ratio corresponding to budgetary revenues or economic productivity of each of the two republics. Because at present the productivity of Czech enterprises is higher, the rate of expenditures in the Czech and Slovak budgets will be higher (in favor of the Czech budget) than the rate of the number of their citizens would warrant.

On the other hand—in agreement with the civic principle—the budget of the federation cannot divide its expenditures between both republics according to their economic productivity or according to the number of their citizens. Therefore, on principle it must include the following basic categories of expenditures:

1. Costs of technical services of the federation, such as the defense of our common state, customs, operation of federal agencies, cost of issued currency, etc.
2. Costs of public welfare, such as unemployment benefits, costs of retraining and of some other forms of social security.
3. Expenditures for control of the market and economy as a whole, such as the fund for control of agricultural markets, or state subsidies for credits and loans for cooperative housing construction, etc. A space must be provided for flexible macroeconomic control particularly in this category of expenditures.
4. Expenditures for programs of statewide importance—for instance, superhighways built across both our republics, or major ecological investments.

Naturally, as far as all those expenditures are concerned, it makes no sense to ponder whether they are allocated for the town of As or for Michalovce, because they benefit all the citizens of our common state. They are significant because, for instance, employed citizens assist the currently unemployed (and not because employed Czechs are supporting the unemployed Slovaks), the healthy assist the sick, the young assist the old, and the achievers help the less successful. If the part of expenditures from the federal budget allocated for Slovakia is higher than the ratio of the Slovaks in the number of the CSFR population would warrant, there is no sense in interpreting that as a redistribution of wealth between

the Czech and the Slovak Republics, but rather as expenditures that reflect our civic solidarity and our desire to share a common state which in the final analysis will benefit us all, whether we live in Slovakia, in Bohemia, or in Moravia.

It makes sense to think along these lines if we want to be, first and foremost, citizens and only then members of this or that nation (or nationality). A common state that is based on any other principle than a civic one is meaningless and nonviable because it cannot find any other principle of solidarity.

Demes on Work of Slovak Foreign Ministry

92CH0125A Prague REPORTER in Czech 23 Oct 91
pp 10-12

[Interview with Pavol Demes, Slovak Republic minister of foreign relations, by Martin Mrnka; place and date not given: "Let Us Not Reproach Each Other"]

[Text] Pavol Demes, 35 years old, was born into a doctor's family in Topolcany. After graduating from high school in Vrable and studying natural sciences at the Comenius University in Bratislava for two years, he transferred to the PrFUK [Faculty of Natural Sciences at Charles University] in Prague. After graduating, he returned to the university in Bratislava where he worked until November 1989, except for a one-year break (working at the University of Alabama). After the revolution, he worked at the SR [Slovak Republic] Ministry of Education as head of the foreign department, and on 6 May this year he accepted the post of SR minister of foreign relations.

[Mrnka] Let us return to the beginnings of your ministry. Was it set up because there really was a need for it or because an acceptable job had to be found for your predecessor, Milan Knazka, after he left the president's office?

[Demes] I do not know any details about the circumstances under which the ministry was set up at the end of last year. I never inquired about it. However, the fact that it exists is not particularly surprising; there are ministries that deal with foreign relations in other regions of Europe, too. For example, apart from the Belgian ministry, there is a Flemish and a Walloon foreign ministry. Naturally, these ministries have separate areas of jurisdiction, which dictate which of them is to deal with what. Therefore, since the Slovak Republic has some important areas of jurisdiction, there was a need to coordinate foreign activities in these areas. This seems to be totally logical to me.

[Mrnka] However, there is a feeling in Bohemia and Moravia that your ministry is, in fact, duplicating the work of the federal office....

[Demes] The difference can already be seen in the name: we deal with foreign relations, while the people around Dienstbier deal with foreign affairs, i.e., basic problems

of foreign policy and state representation.... I would not think it strange if Viktorie Hradská were the Czech Republic minister of foreign relations instead of the deputy chairwoman of the Czech government committee.

[Mrnka] The fears about duplication seem to be caused by the fact that many Czechs feel that your ministry is a threat to the federation to some extent.

[Demes] As I have already stated, there is nothing unusual about our ministry, even if the Czechs have implied this on more than one occasion. The ministry does not contain the germ of separatism or unjustified emancipation. That is a wrong view, and we should forget it. It is the result of our ministry's mission.

[Mrnka] Could you elaborate on that a little?

[Demes] We could summarize our work by grouping it into several larger segments. The first is that, following the allocation of areas of jurisdiction, Slovakia itself must deal with relations with the regions. The Slovak Republic may conclude agreements with parts of those states that have diplomatic relations with the CSFR. In other words, if Minister Dienstbier enters diplomatic relations with any country that has regional units, then the Slovak Republic may conclude its own agreements with the latter. This is how we concluded bilateral agreements with Bavaria, Catalonia, Georgia, and we are considering agreements with other Soviet republics as long as they retain the same status as they now have.

From the drafted agreements, we are preparing agreements with some Swiss cantons, Canadian provinces, and with individual states of the United States of America, particularly New Hampshire and Ontario at this time. But we need some kind of administration to deal with this, one official in a departmental ministry or in the cabinet of the government could not manage it all.

A second area is the Slovak government's activity abroad—ranging from apparent trifles of protocol, for instance where which flag should fly during an official visit, through to delineating the Slovak government's strategy toward foreign partners in relation to economic areas of jurisdiction and political support for economic activities.

Another larger segment is the coordination of foreign aid. The European communities will not deal with each department individually; they will place a specific package, for example the PHARE program, at our disposal and we will then sit down with Minister Dlouhy and divide up the specified amount between the republics; we will then help in allocating it within the framework of the Slovak Republic because the federal ministry does not have a detailed insight into the needs of some republican ministries. Apart from this, we also deal with matters concerning our countrymen in Europe and overseas, and there really are a large number of them....

[Mrnka] Since you mentioned this problem, do you help countrymen in regions that are under threat? What I have in mind are Yugoslavia, Romania...

[Demes] In relation to Yugoslavia, we are playing the same key role in Slovakia as Viktorie Hradská is playing in Bohemia-Moravia. Our employees travelled to the region where our countrymen live, ascertained what was happening, and then got the Red Cross and the Matice Slovenska [Slovak Association] involved; the result was that a truckload of medical supplies was sent and 106 children were transported under escort to our territory. The government allocated 1.5 million Czechoslovak [Kcs] for this purpose...

But I would like to return to other tasks that the ministry has. These include creating an image for Slovakia abroad. We are preparing documents for accredited journalists, promotional material on Slovakia for foreign entrepreneurs, a brief history of our country in foreign languages—something that has never been published before.... In short, we are trying to let the world know that we are here.

[Mrnka] Does this mean that you should also supervise cultural centers abroad...including the House of Slovak Culture in Prague?

[Demes] For the time being, these institutions fall under the Administration of Cultural Facilities of the FMZV [Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. However, it is a matter of time. I believe that it would be more practical and cheaper if these facilities were under our control. I am an advocate of common sense and of doing what is most practical and most advantageous. I try to emphasize that the better our foreign relations on the level of the republics, the better the assessment of the foreign policy of the whole federation. On the other hand, if we ruin something, foreign diplomats will leave our country with the feeling that there is something wrong in Czechoslovakia.

It is a matter of proportions, we must not reproach each other, we must have at least enough mutual trust that we will not undermine each other's feet. In this context, our office has good relations with the FMZV as well as with the Czech government committee. If only this were the case with all problems to do with mutual relations between the two republics....

[Mrnka] Before we deal with this probably crucial question, I would like to know something else. You mentioned so many problems that you have to deal with, that it is appropriate to ask how many people you employ, and what kind of budget you have?

[Demes] We have by far the lowest budget of all the Slovak government departments, and we have a little more than 80 employees. This includes gatekeepers and chauffeurs. They all have more than enough work.

[Mrnka] You said that you advocate the most reasonable approach. Nevertheless, I believe that an institution like

yours tends toward a kind of Parkinson's Law growth, that there are so many problems that it starts to create its own. Do you agree?

[Demes] We are trying to prevent this, naturally. After I came to the ministry, I tried to set up a structure that will correspond with what people are doing. I do not have many bosses, certainly the least per capita in our country. Our employees work in teams that are accountable for themselves.

[Mrnka] How many people did you succeed in luring away from the FMZV?

[Demes] I succeeded in luring one important person from there, and he is now the head of the territorial department. Otherwise, apart from a few exceptions, they are people who come to us on the basis of language and psychological prerequisites; we are trying to make our ministry into a base for training diplomats. However, our strength should not be in the number of people but in the quality of the information we work with.

[Mrnka] A base for training diplomats, however, rather supports the suspicions—perhaps justified ones—that the trend to make Slovakia independent is motivated, among other things, by the fact that an independent ministry of foreign affairs will be established here and a number of lucrative jobs will be created. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Demes] We do not consider each other to be barbarians. We are dealing with much more complex matters than, for instance, the post of ambassador in Paris. Although, of course, there is no difference between this ministry and normal life. There are many people who desire power; one person would like to be president, another the director of a factory....

[Mrnka] One of the reasons I asked this is because the potential separation of the republics would not only create attractive posts such as ambassadors but, above all, it would be necessary to reestablish all the ties with the world that were broken. Including economic ones, e.g., GATT, and the reconfirmation of preferential treatment from the United States.... Do you have the nucleus of a team that would be able to prepare something like that? President Havel's adviser, Eng. Zamecnik, estimates that it would take two to three years to surmount the legal vacuum in which the Czechs and the Slovaks would find themselves....

[Demes] We certainly have a nucleus. I have already told you all the things we do. Naturally it would be very difficult because, of course, we do not have any international lawyers; they are few and far between. But this question will not stand up; at the very least ethically, it is unacceptable. Preserving the federation with such arguments is nonsense. From a practical political perspective, there are many emotions in the nation—not only in Slovakia—and these emotions are irrational.

It is the same thing as if you were dating a girl, and I were to tell you that it is a perfect match because she has a lot of money. However, you would primarily ask yourself what it would be like to live with her. And if your answer were "not good," you would do better to choose a girl with no money and live with her in a sublease for five years. The argument that the first girl already owns a house will not stand up. It is just as senseless as when Minister Baksay enumerated in billions what separation would cost us.

Of course, we have to put all our arguments on the table now, including economic ones; but I consider the idea of preserving the federation merely because of what it would cost us to be gross insensitivity. If we mutually start conjuring up the bogeyman, will drive ourselves into a corner.

[Mrnka] So I should consider you to be an advocate of separation?

[Demes] No you should not.

There are various ways in which nations can coexist. After all, we cannot say, "If you don't want what exists now, let's end it," we must not drive the situation to extremes: either this type of federation or a Slovak state. That is the wrong way to put it. Let us try to attain a common state of Czechs and Slovaks; but if a proper referendum is held and the people in Bohemia-Moravia answer that they want a Czech state, and in Slovakia they answer that they want a Slovak state, then, quite simply, two new states will be created among the other states that are being created in this area.

At this time, Europe is undergoing a battle for areas of jurisdiction; this is not merely a Slovak or a Czechoslovak problem. Recently, when I was in Venice, I discovered there was a movement to expel all Italians from Venice—they simply consider themselves to be Venetians and they want all Italians to go back south. This, of course, is an extreme, but there are also the Catalonians, the Bavarians, the Scots.... Europe is in motion, and I believe this right; people are holding on to communities and, within the framework of the great unifying trend, they are questioning the existing state units and are looking for a smaller units. I saw this in America, which is not built on a federal state, or even on individual states, but on the communities in which the people live. So I do not consider this motion to be unnatural. As long as it is guided by common sense.

[Mrnka] However, one could have grave doubts about common sense in connection with the present political development in our country.

[Demes] I agree. But in some cases maybe we would see the manifestations of the absence of common sense differently. For example, we were in Romania recently, before the unrest, and we were negotiating with the leading representatives of that country. The only article that appeared in the Czech press merely mentioned talks with the papal nuncio who is Slovak by origin. Allegedly

we examined the Vatican's eastern policies. This was a complete distortion; it was a minor detail in a relatively substantial state visit, which reinforced the status of Czechoslovakia in that country. I consider this to be a purposeful reproach, the desire to see something that is not there. In other words, one individual is playing in a symphony orchestra, the other is playing in a chamber orchestra; but surely it should not be a matter of which orchestra he is playing in, but of the music that he is playing.

However, this does not fit the image that is being painted of us. If you can find one single sentence in the Czech press in which the boss of the Cernin Palace states that our ministry is doing a good job and is contributing to the fact that Czechoslovakia as a country is better viewed in the world, as, for example his secretary-general, Karel Kovanda, did recently in an interview for the MS [Ministry of Education], then I will buy you a bottle of champagne. So far, we have not found such a comment although, on our part, we have been accommodating more than once. I believe we should show more mutual respect. I do not need Minister Dienstbier to slap me on the shoulder and say, "Pavol, you are a great guy." What I need is for a positive demonstration of good relations between the nations that he represents on a federal level and I represent here. I will not reproach him, but if he overlooks something substantial in the mutual relations, then it worries me.

[Mrnka] However, willful reproaches can also be found in Slovak politics, for example, what happened with the Czechoslovak-German agreement.... You had the opportunity to comment on it and, in the meantime, the prime minister and the speaker of parliament protested against it, stating that no one had discussed it with your party.

[Demes] The problem is that it arrived on Friday evening without them knowing about it and Carnogursky and Miklosko sent off that response.

[Mrnka] So it was Mr. Carnogursky's and Mr. Miklosko's mistake?

[Demes] Let's not say that it was a mistake, let us just say that they acted on their own initiative. I do not think it was a particularly fortuitous one, and I told them so. After that, the Slovak government also made some comments. It discussed the issue for a long time and came to the conclusion that the sentence in the preamble is not inevitable in this form. However, it does not intend to cause any major problems because of it; after all, we want this agreement, too, and we agreed with all its provisions without exception. However, in the Czech Republic there was a wave of incomprehension and even anger. Yet it is rather indicative that not a single Czech newspaper published the entire text of Mr. Carnogursky's and Mr. Miklosko's letter. In fact, they even described Tis's *Slovensky stat* [Slovak State] as a trauma for the Slovak nation. Naturally, instead of a reasonable explanation of the situation, this whole thing was blown up into a major affair.

[Mrnka] A similar problem arose about a month ago, when the prime minister had an interview with LIBERATION and said that the Slovak state should enter the EC as an independent state after the year 2000. I suspect that you also published your position.

[Demes] We only said that that was the opinion of the prime minister and not of the government. But that is precisely the role I have to play; if we are responsible for foreign relations, it is up to us to resolve such problems. Nevertheless, I would like to state that my relations with Mr. Carnogursky were and still are very good.

[Mrnka] Could one therefore say that your ministry is a kind of moderator of conflicts, that it is trying to play a positive role in respect to the Czech nation?

[Demes] I could say yes, but I would rather tell you what annoys me in relations with the Czech nation.

Your politicians keep using arguments such as "You know, I was in Slovakia in the army, we shared a room with soldier Joza and we still write to each other." Why do they keep saying that? It is as if I were to say that I dated a girl in Prague and therefore I will not allow anyone to attack the Czechs. But I will not allow the Czechs to be attacked because they are a decent nation, just like other nations, and not because I had a girlfriend in Bohemia-Moravia. When politicians use such arguments it leads nowhere. All the more so, because, should we separate, we will still continue to live side by side. Even separation is no reason for us not to communicate with each other in a decent way.

[Mrnka] What will you do if the two nations separate?

[Demes] Naturally I will no longer be here at the ministry.

[Mrnka] Why?

[Demes] Because the people who want separation would have won in politics. And I am not one of them.

[Mrnka] Thank you for the interview.

Baksay on Contemporary Slovak Politics

92CH0137A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
1, 2 Nov 91

[Interview in two installments with Jozef Baksay, Federal minister of foreign trade, by Jan Dobrovsky in Prague; date not given: "I Shall Endure Even Under Fascism"]

[1 Nov p 16]

[Text] On Tuesday, Minister of Foreign Trade J. Baksay spoke on television and warned of the danger of increasing fascism in Slovakia. In the Central Military Hospital in Prague, where he is still recovering from injuries sustained in an automobile accident, he readily answered some questions.

[Dobrovsky] What you said is very serious, particularly because you are not the only one who is drawing attention to the danger of fascism. Who do you think is behind it?

[Baksay] I will not name names, but it is generally known which movements and parties are doing all they can to achieve a breakup of the federation. The only democratic way to decide the structure of the future state is a referendum. Opposing the referendum are precisely those people who want an independent Slovak state. The logical conclusion is that if these people insist on secession, but at the same time are afraid of the referendum, the only thing left to them is to achieve their aims by intimidation and terror.

[Dobrovsky] In your opinion, what in this connection is the role of Jan Carnogursky, whose political moves raise doubts about his sincerity?

[Baksay] I would not put Jan Carnogursky into any specific group at all. He is a deeply religious man, and his inner convictions rest in the Christianity of the 19th century with all that it involves. Since he happens to be the prime minister just now, he is naturally trying to inject his ideas into politics as well. That is normal, and I would not blame him for it. Much worse are those people who used to help the former regime, and now are trying to use the nationalist feelings of the citizens to push through their ideas.

[Dobrovsky] In your television appearance you spoke directly about former boxers and musicians.

[Baksay] Yes. They are Meciar and Panis.

[2 Nov pp 1, 8]

[Text] Vladimir Meciar is a representative of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], which is also supported by the Independent Association of Slovak Economists [NEZES]. Its activities manifest socialist tendencies, and it obviously distances itself from the present economic reform....

[Baksay] It is a group of people who during the former regime held positions as, for example, professors. They got their positions and titles then, and we know very well who could receive such a title at that time. Their economic views are the views of the third way, and because a third way simply does not exist, the NEZES views are simply unacceptable to me.

[Dobrovsky] But NEZES plays quite an important role in Slovak politics. How do you explain the fact that advocates of the third way generally wield so much influence on the Slovak political scene?

[Baksay] You know, that is exactly the tragedy of the first few months following the 17 November in Slovakia. At that time that broad-spectrum movement, Public Against Violence [VPN], came into being, which during the initial phase really did the most for introducing democracy. Because it was, and still is, permeated by the

idea of humanism and democracy, it made possible the entry into its ranks, and thus even into some functions, of people who do not subscribe to a liberal approach to life at all. They are the so-called revivalists, whose politics is unacceptable to VPN, because it is based on outright socialist tendencies.

[Dobrovsky] It is not difficult today to imagine that Slovakia will secede.

[Baksay] Unfortunately.

[Dobrovsky] But then there will be elections. Will the communists win?

[Baksay] That is a bigger problem than the impending breakup of the state. In the Czech lands, the forces pushing the radical economic reform will probably win. But of course in Slovakia, according to public opinion polls, socialist-leaning parties, among which I definitely count HZDS, the Communists, and the Slovak National Party [SNS], could form a governing coalition, with which no federation, no common state would be possible.

[Dobrovsky] What chances do they have individually?

[Baksay] Not very good. Communists will get what they have—that 9-10 percent. A worse problem are the populists. That is Meciar and his political group. But even there disagreements are showing up. They do have some people who are more sensible, such as Mr. Filkus, who understand the economic aspects of future politics.

[Dobrovsky] Mr. Filkus, of course, was one of the founding fathers of NEZES and has significantly influenced the economic orientation of HZDS. Now he tends to support the reform. How do you explain that?

[Baksay] He is simply a sensible economist. An economist just needs to sit down, pick up a calculator, and calculate. That is an exact science, not fanciful abstractions. Everyone who does that cannot come to any other conclusion.

[Dobrovsky] Did the fact that HZDS expected him to be the minister of economy of the future Slovak state perhaps play a role in Filkus' case? Then, of course, the burden of a stalled reform would be on his shoulders.

[Baksay] I would hesitate to comment on his personal motives, because I do not know what they are. We enjoy a good relationship and I would hate to spoil it. But you may be right to some degree.

[Dobrovsky] Let's go back to your television appearance. You also drew attention to the statement by Federal Assembly Deputy Slota, that all "federal" Slovaks will be tried as traitors. What can be done about such pronouncements?

[Baksay] We live, at least I think we do, in a legal and democratic state. So far. That state has agencies which must ensure that law is upheld. If one deputy of the

Federal Assembly, who pledged allegiance to CSFR, can manage to brand his fellow citizens as traitors to the nation only because they have a different opinion, the prosecutor's office should react to it immediately. After all, he at the very least broke the law on two points. He denied the right to free expression and violated his deputy's oath. Unfortunately, the prosecutor's office of the Slovak Republic did not take any steps whatsoever. I think that the federal prosecutor general should not have kept silent, either.

[Dobrovsky] But what is to be done if the agencies that have the authority remain silent?

[Baksay] That is a typical case that could have come directly from the thirties. At that time, things began with seemingly small incidents which then escalated into a catastrophe. Or take Yugoslavia now. People, who have lived together for years without any problems, liked each other, that even applies to mixed marriages, all of a sudden face each other with weapons as enemies. Precisely because of the escalation of nationalism and fascism.

[Dobrovsky] If history repeats itself so inexorably, isn't it proof of democracy's weak position vis-a-vis political extremism?

[Baksay] I think it is. Personally, I think that the Czech side (the Slovaks will stone me again for this) should have adopted a more rigid attitude. The Czech representatives, mind you, with good intentions and because of the profound humanism in which they believe, and because Petr Pithart is truly a convinced humanist, thought that if they would be forthcoming on the objectively existing Slovak problems, that their partner would do likewise. But in that respect we were witnesses to total disappointment.

[Dobrovsky] And what about the police? In your opinion, how did it handle the situation during the demonstration in the Square of the Slovak National Uprising?

[Baksay] I think that the organizers fully discharged their duties stemming from the law on assembly. Although the order-keeping police units were in place, there are testimonies that the policemen totally failed to respond to direct appeals by citizens. And no wonder. After all, in the security force there are elements well known to everyone. It is therefore understandable that these people do not approve of the current changes. And passivity is precisely the way they can express their disapproval. In other instances, it could perhaps be simply indecisiveness.

[Dobrovsky] How then do you understand the statement of the Minister of Interior Pittner that he could not handle the situation better because Slovakia does not have its own secret service?

[Baksay] Similarly as Klepac's proposal for establishing a home defense force. It is a step toward an independent

Slovakia. I cannot imagine a common state with separate criminal and secret services. Who would coordinate them? In the end the secret services would work against each other. Although I am not, thank God, an expert in these matters and I pity Jan Langos for having to deal with it, I fundamentally disagree with Pittner's efforts.

[Dobrovsky] Can the explanation then be that the Slovak government is taking steps toward independence?

[Baksay] It is hard to see inside people's souls. In the Slovak government there are also ministers from Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence [ODU-VPN]. They are very actively trying to push through the idea of a common state. Whether there are also other ministers who talk one way but think differently, is difficult to judge.

[Dobrovsky] What prospects for preserving the republic do you see then?

[Baksay] Only one. The referendum. On the Slovak side everybody is operating with nationality and majority. It amounts to hiding behind Potemkin's villages. I still believe in the silent majority, for whom the referendum would be an opportunity to express its views without fear. I know from my own experience that in Slovakia there are whole regions, for example in the East Slovakia Kraj, which totally support the common state. People, you see, have had experiences also with Bratislava-centrism, and Eastern Slovakia in particular always got along with Prague without any problems.

[Dobrovsky] You said, without fear. This is something that is being mentioned in connection with Slovakia ever more often....

[Baksay] There is truly reason to be afraid. The cases of Fedor Gal and Marcel Stryk are already well known. A great many other citizens, who are not politicians or well known in other ways, have had their windows broken, have received various death threats, and are being followed at every step. There is fear in Slovakia and you can feel it. A considerable role in this is played by the mass media, where differences of opinion are an absolute exception. Such exceptions are then rewarded by threatening letters or withdrawal of subsidies, without which they cannot manage. Moreover, the mass media are larded through and through with former agents of State Security, who support separatism unequivocally.

[Dobrovsky] What are these people after?

[Baksay] Hard to say. Preserving their positions, mainly. Perhaps they want power, perhaps they are still following orders from someone else. The only way to combat this is by democratic means. By talking and by talking. And, of course, by a referendum.

[Dobrovsky] And if Slovakia were to secede nevertheless, what would you yourself do?

[Baksay] I endured under communism, I shall endure under fascism, too. Even though it will not be easy, there is really nothing else to do.

Political Importance of Carnogursky, Meciar Viewed

92CH0139A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Slovak 31 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Stefan Hrib: "The Common State and One Relationship..."]

[Text] It has been quite some time since Jan Carnogursky came up with the idea of an independent entry by Slovakia into integrated Europe. It immediately brought forth conflicting reactions. It was the first time that this idea was expressed by somebody whose intellect and realistic approach cannot be in doubt. Until then, the illusions of primitive nationalists were not taken very seriously even by themselves.

The idea brought forth another, and thus the idea of a treaty of two sovereign republics was born. From the very beginning its substance was understood as the first step toward the star that the EC astronomers will name Slovakia. The Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] was alone in promoting this idea, it even exposed itself to the danger of attacks from both sides. The nationalists saw it as too federalist, the federalists saw it as clearly nationalistic. But the situation on the Slovak political scene has changed considerably since then. Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] broke away from Public Against Violence [VPN]. This movement, supported by that section of the public which felt frustrated by the reform, immediately began the washing of Slovak brains. The brainwashing succeeded. In Slovakia the word federation soon became, thanks to Meciar, a synonym for evil, and an atmosphere was created where the success-intoxicated leader of the movement even dared to call the federalists inferior people or idiots. And that a short time ago he supported the federation, he self-confidently explained by the fact that he has developed ideologically. And also, as always, that the evil Czechs drove him to it.

In this situation Carnogursky's Christian Democrats found themselves in a quandary. They are still in a coalition with Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence [ODU-VPN], the Democratic Party [DS], and the Independent Hungarian Initiative [MNI], that is, with parties that are all federalist-oriented, while the cooperation of KDH with HZDS and SNS [Slovak National Party] would be much closer to Jan Carnogursky's star-spangled dream.

But hidden somewhere in this is a fundamental problem, the understanding of which will help understand all the state-forming question marks from Vikarky to Stirin. It is shocking, but more than all the discussions of the Slovak and Czech National Councils, more than the conflicts between the governments of both republics, and even more than the President's speeches and initiatives

aimed at preserving the CSFR, today, of more importance for the future of the common state is the relationship between two people. The relationship between Jan Carnogursky and Vladimir Meciar.

These two politicians obviously cannot stand each other. Meciar cannot forgive Carnogursky for taking the position of Prime Minister away from him. Obviously, he also cannot forgive him his intellectual superiority, his standing in Europe, and his cooperation with VPN. Carnogursky sees Meciar's tendencies toward a totalitarian rule, his popularity (even though cheap) in Slovakia, and the socialist background of HZDS (and the latest, the Independent Association of Slovak Economists [NEZES]). Compounding all this is the personal antipathy between the two.

The result is that KDH wants an independent Slovakia, but without Meciar. But that is not possible, and Carnogursky knows it. That is why KDH professes interest in a common state, which distances it from the KZDS, but at the same time presents demands that are consistent with an independent state. This schizophrenic attitude is the result of a well-founded fear, shrewdness, or political skill, call it what you will, of Jan Carnogursky. Czech politicians, who are racking their brains trying to understand the logic of the Slovak concepts, should give it up. There is no logic behind them. Only two people.

One thing is clear. As long as Meciar will be Meciar, today's KDH will not cooperate with him. It realizes only too well that after elections the Slovakia of one's dreams would become a "Meciarism" with a Leader at its helm. And so KDH will be forced, against its will, to speak about a common state. That fact should be the basis for all discussions about its form.

Vladimir Meciar is an interesting person. By trying to divide Czechoslovakia into two states he is succeeding in preserving it (even if perhaps only temporarily). By making an effort to preserve it, he would lose his supporters. And so instead of politics, he has been lately busy repairing the roof of his cottage. Obviously, it has begun to rain dangerously into it.

Carnogursky's View of First Republic Faulted

92CH0150B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
15 Nov 91 p 8

[Article by Jaroslav Opat, director of the T.G. Masaryk Institute, Prague: "Comments on Jan Carnogursky's Constitutional Philosophy"]

[Text] "Masaryk's republic is ending," replied Jan Carnogursky in an interview when the editors of LIDOVE NOVINY asked him how would the development in Czechoslovakia change if he would be the president or the prime minister of the republic. At the same time, he counterposed "Masaryk's" republic to his own concept of Czechoslovakia's constitutional future as a "republic

of republics" in which the "new" republic would allegedly have to be respected "to a higher degree" than at present.

His theses are serious but very hazy in more than one respect, mainly because their author does not give as much as a hint about what he means by the term "Masaryk's republic." Not only a historian but even a citizen with some knowledge of Czechoslovakia's history recognizes that the concept that may be legitimately, albeit with some reservations, called "Masaryk's" republic first ended in part after the Munich Agreement in 1938 and in general after 14 and 16 [as published] March 1939. After World War II the attempt to rebuild Czechoslovakia at least to some extent on Masaryk's ideological foundations did not last long. It was shattered in February 1948 by the communists of the Stalinist orientation. What then followed was a harsh, very radical programmatic denial of Masaryk's democratic constitutional philosophy. Most generations living today still vividly remember how the increased attempts to return to Masaryk's concept of Czechoslovakia's democracy were suppressed in 1968 and in the years thereafter. After 17 November 1989 the Czechs and Slovaks inherited a republic that resembled Masaryk's era in the name only, and even that in a distorted "socialist" form. In its essence, it was Brezhnev's and Husak's totalitarian dictatorship. For that reason, during the days of November 1989, tens and hundreds of thousands of people in our towns kept invoking Masaryk's name in several variations. For them it symbolized a life in freedom and democracy—a life for which they yearned. In view of these crystal-clear facts, how should a reader understand Carnogursky's dictum that Masaryk's republic is at its end? Is it perhaps a postulate or a political challenge by a Slovak politician to Czech politicians that they depart from the tradition of "Masaryk's" pre-Munich republic?

The attitude to this tradition is objectively a problem of the continuity or discontinuity of the further development of the Czechoslovak state. Undoubtedly, Jan Carnogursky is well aware of that and therefore, he referred to it in his interview. He thinks that "Czech as well as foreign politicians are now willing to recognize any kind of state continuity—be it federal, confederative, or even a looser type."

I am not so sure about that; I cannot ascertain whether Jan Carnogursky's assumptions about the attitudes of Czech politicians to this problem are justified. All I can do as a politically minded citizen is to doubt that Czech politicians are really willing to recognize "any kind" of continuity of our state whose transformation is currently on the agenda, if one of their most prominent partners on the Slovak side rejects "Masaryk's" republic as the basis for its potential continuity. It is easy to see what would be left to them as well as to Carnogursky to continue with under such circumstances: The years of World War II, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Slovak State. I do not think—at least, I do not believe—that this is what Jan Carnogursky has in

mind but if he excludes ("Masaryk's") republic between the two wars from serving as a springboard for Czechoslovakia's ongoing constitutional restructuring, that quite logically leads to such a possible interpretation of his statement.

As for myself, I am convinced that it is precisely the pre-Munich republic that offers all—the Czechs as much as the Slovaks—the best foundations for the further coexistence of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state, naturally, provided that those foundations are critically reassessed. Whether anybody likes it or not and all its shortcomings notwithstanding, it still was a remarkably democratic republic, mainly (though not solely) thanks to Masaryk. The whole democratic world recognized that fact, only the communists—and even they not always—and the fascists denied it. It transformed the Czech as well as the Slovak nation, oppressed by the old monarchy, into nations with a democratic government. For instance, in 1924 in his book *New Slovakia* E.W. Seton-Watson, a Scotsman and a great friend of the Slovaks, who had fought for their rights and freedoms long before World War I, described what the republic had done and accomplished for the cultural advancement of the Slovaks who had been systematically denationalized by the Budapest government. He could find no comparison "in all of modern European history" for the extent and effect of positive achievements, for example, in the area of education after 1918. And at that time even Andrej Hlinka recognized Masaryk's personal contribution to that progress. In 1921 he greeted Masaryk in Ruzomberok as a man who was the "greatest defender and protector of justice, rights and laws" as well as of political and autonomous efforts and rights of the Slovaks as a nation. On the basis of known facts, I am convinced that this is how Masaryk acted the whole time he was the president of our state.

The relatively extensive interview contains several other controversial statements; the replies to some of them, for instance, Carnogursky's interpretation and criticism of liberalism, have already appeared in the press. Therefore, I think that if in his interview Jan Carnogursky intended to articulate his constitutional political philosophy, his philosophy is very unclear and at best, misleading.

Slovak Historian Reviews Contemporary Issues

92CH0138A Prague NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY
in Czech 2 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prof. Jan Mlynarik, Charles University, Prague, by Marta Svagrova and Karel Polansky; place and date not given: "When the Nation Learned To Steal"—first paragraph is NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The control of your affairs will return to you, my people, it will return.... Well, it is returning the hard way and people in these parts are beginning to feel tired of the never-ending disputes and misunderstandings at many

levels. It seems that at the present time they no longer expect much even from the parliament, although it is precisely from the parliament that they have the right to expect the most. Why that is so, we discussed with Dr. Jan Mlynarik, Deputy in the Federal Assembly, historian from Slovakia, who is defending in Prague the idea of a common state, but also the interests of Carpathian and Sudeten Germans, which earned him the ill will of some Slovaks as well as some Czechs:

[Mlynarik] I know that the current parliament cannot take care in two years of everything it was charged with doing. That is Sisyphus' labors. It may be that we shall not be able to take care even of the so badly needed constitutions, which must, after all, be tied in with a multitude of already created laws. If we could work 24 hours a day, we would have to take up at this moment the entire legislation from the beginning, start with the civil code (we are only now getting around to it, just the draft has about 300 pages) and proceed according to the logic of needs. But we only have 8 months left, and some of that time will be swallowed up by the election campaign. Even now some of the deputies (and not just a few) are trying to place their personal careers ahead of the public interest, the interests of the citizens, and the national interests. I consider it to be the greatest shortcoming of the present parliament.

Abolishing Monarchy Was Enough

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] But the criticism is directed more at the inadequacy of the laws that were passed....

[Mlynarik] None of the laws that have been passed thus far fulfill either objectively, or in my opinion, all the necessary requirements. As long as they are not interlinked, we shall just continue to create prototypes that will have to be modified later. After all, it is not possible to rectify in two years what was stifled after 1938. There has been an enormous void in democratic development since then. In 1918, the emerging republic could take over almost the entire legislature from Austria-Hungary. During the constitutional monarchy (since 1867) a great many democratic laws were already in force (for example, there was even a statute on political prisoners), so that it was basically enough to abolish the monarchy and the titles of the nobility. There is a certain background of a democratic society here, as well as industrial potential, but we have become a developing country, and the current parliament found this society in the wasteland of moral degradation.

Somewhat Different Code

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] On what can you base your decisions today, then?

[Mlynarik] We are learning to make our decisions in the spirit of classical ideals of tolerance which reflect Christian culture. After all, our nations have been developing within its sphere for more than a thousand years, and there exist eternal laws on which civilization has been

built and on which it rests. We are also trying to incorporate into our laws the Ten Commandments, which are the determining code of Christian culture. Therefore, we do not need to think up anything new, it is just that we have forgotten so much during those 40, 50 years. For the former regime the main means for controlling society was atheism. Khrushchev proclaimed the so-called Code of the New Man, but that did not take hold in the Soviet Union, let alone here. Simply because the Christian code is embedded in our conditions.

We Cannot Take Out an Advertisement...

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] You have become personally very involved in the reevaluation how the expulsion of the Germans is viewed. Why?

[Mlynarik] We have been trying to think where in Bohemia (the only democratic state in Central Europe in the era between the two wars) so much brutality was found, which then manifested itself in the trials of the fifties, for example. And then we gradually came to the year 1945.... It was then, when the property of 3 million people became available, that the nation learned to steal. It was then when it learned to kill and not respect human values, and actually created a substitute war in areas where it was not physically present. That substitute war began after 9 May 1945, and those violent phases of the expulsion were also part of it. People write to me that this expresses my hatred of the Czech nation, but that is nonsense. I have been living in Bohemia since 1952, except for those eight years of exile in Bavaria. I feel respect toward the Czech nation, and this failing of such an educated and cultured nation of Masaryk and Komensky makes me sad. I point out these things out of love and respect for it. Moreover, we live in immediate proximity to the German nation, and we cannot take out an advertisement announcing that we are going to move. That is why we must make an effort to see that our common life is lived in decency, that is why we must resolve issues that are still open. With historical erudition, responsibility, and sometimes also with civic courage. To arrive at least at what the Polish bishops arrived at: reconciliation, forgiveness, acknowledgment of the disaster that occurred here.

Lower Class Citizens

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] Property settlement, of course, goes hand in hand with it....

[Mlynarik] We decided not to apply restitutions prior to 1948, therefore the property confiscated by presidential decrees in 1945 will not be returned. But there are several tens of thousands of people of mixed marriages that live here and to whom citizenship was returned in 1950, but to whom property cannot be returned. I consider that to be a great injustice, because we are putting these fellow citizens into a lower category of citizenship. Two of my colleagues and I are therefore considering an amendment to the law, which would enable the property to be returned to them. Besides the

Sudeten Germans, the Carpathian Germans are also being forgotten. There were 180,000 of them, and that is not a negligible problem for Slovakia.

Another great task remains for the next parliament: settlement of the property issue with the expelled Germans, and reparations due us by the FRG as the successor state of the Third Reich. Personally, I consider it unfortunate that in the new treaty with Germany these issues have not been addressed; perhaps it was not possible because of the technical and time aspects involved. Maybe then in the next stage. But at the same time, FRG already settled that issue with France, Poland, Hungary, Israel, but not with us. Thus far only relatives of the victims of medical experiments have been compensated, that is roughly 1 percent of the total volume of reparations which should be given to us.

Clear Proof

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] In addition to the older history, the immediate past is now on the table. As a historian you study it, as a deputy you are influencing the manner in which it is being dealt with.

[Mlynarik] The people who made the democratic revolution in November 1989 relied too much on the belief that the defeated group will acknowledge that the days of its rule are over, and that those people will draw consequences from that fact for themselves personally as well as for society. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Those people just shook themselves off, and are still sitting in their old positions. We are getting clear proof of huge thefts, behind which are the economic mafias, supported and protected by the former political power. Without screenings we shall not be able to lay our hands on them. During the "talks with deputies," people tell me that the mafiosi are laughing at the new power, because it is unable to take away their economic, or political, influence in the regions. That is why I voted in favor of the screening law. Let them engage in business with what they made at the expense of the nation, but they should not want to be judges, prosecutors, they should not want to teach in schools, be mayors, simply anything that influences the course of public affairs. Moreover, this law will be in force only five years, whereas 600,000 people who protested against the "international assistance" were for 20 years unable to get any positions where they could have used their qualifications at least to some degree. In comparison with the practice used against us by the normalizers, our screening law looks incomparably milder.

What They Do Not Want To Hear

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] You are a Slovak, but some Slovaks reproach you for your "Czechoslovak" attitude....

[Mlynarik] I often encounter in this respect a fundamental ignorance of historical dates and connections, particularly among Slovak deputies who represent the extreme nationalist wing. They do not know, or do not

want to know, how this state was formed, that it was necessary to present the concept of a uniform Czechoslovak nation to the Powers, if only to be able to establish the republic at all. Masaryk thought that it would take 50 years to consolidate it. It was given only 20 years.... Recently, we were remembering the establishment of the republic, and it is worth noting that on 30 October 1918 all Slovak political representatives agreed together to form a common state with the Czechs—the Czechoslovak Republic. They laid the foundations of a unitary state with the provision that it can be internally modified later. Unfortunately, the appearance of the Third Reich on the European scene put an end to such moves. The Slovak nationalist politicians do not want to hear that a totalitarian, fascist state then came into being in Slovakia, which has the genocide of 70,000 Slovak Jews on its conscience. That to claim such a state as a state-forming mainspring is a mockery of the memory of all those who fell. It is a viewpoint that a democratic world cannot accept, and it discredits us.

Historical Memory

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] How does the fact that you are a historian help you in the parliament?

[Mlynarik] For the Slovak side I am a Czechoslovakist, for the Czech yellow press I am an agent of the German secret service. Perhaps the only ones who are not against me are the Hungarians and the Gypsies, of whom there are many in my electoral district. (My proposal to form a parliamentary commission on the Gypsy issue has thus far not been successful, but sooner or later the parliament will establish it anyway.) The view of a historian can never be across-the-board; it must respect historical facts. Here we are also encountering the legacy of those decades of brain washing. An occupier, who wants to dominate a nation, to render it blind and deaf, first of all tries to strip it of its historical memory which for people is the source of certain pride, national consciousness, feeling of security. The fascist and bolshevik occupiers have unfortunately succeeded in accomplishing that here.

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] A number of things then should be put back into historical memory. That certainly includes one of your life's subjects—the personality of M.R. Stefanik. How can he speak to the present?

[Mlynarik] Stefanik is relevant to the present because of his wish to bring Slovaks to the level of free European nations, but in cooperation with the Czech nation. Given today's utilitarian efforts of the extremist nationalist circles, he would have to be spinning in his grave if he heard the arguments about the establishment of the Czechoslovak state that are now being used in Slovakia. According to the terminology of the extremists, he would be the greatest Czechoslovakist in the history of our nations. He created a certain concept of the nation's liberation (it is becoming also my political credo): we can

liberate ourselves only with the Czechs, with our closest Slavic nation, we can accomplish nothing in opposition to them, only with them.

During the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the republic, Masaryk said that two things were successfully accomplished: land reform and the establishment of a school system in Slovakia. In Slovakia, where not a single national Slovak school existed, there were 3,000 in 1928, plus a university and technical schools. I pointed that out in my work *Ceska inteligence na Slovensku v letech 1918-38* [Czech Intelligentsia in Slovakia 1918-38], which was published by Index in Cologne in 1985, but so far has not found its way to our publishing houses. In contrast to the book about Stefanik, *Cesta ke hvězdám a svobodě* [The Way to the Stars and Freedom], which your house published.

Thinking for Itself

[NEDELNI LIDOVE NOVINY] Do you think that society will be able to deal with this extremist clamor?

[Mlynarik] The Slovak civic society (including the Hungarians, Ruthenes, and Germans) is not as dumb as it would appear from the clamor of the extremists. If Hlinka's Slovak People's Party is being revived today, that is absolute nonsense. What played a certain role in its time, cannot speak today to a cultured, democratically thinking Slovak. That has nothing to do with Hlinka, but with the movement which misused his name. And again, there is a group coming into view which emphasizes that the Slovak State was the most shining place in Slovak history. I do not underestimate the voters, people are already thinking for themselves, they have their experiences. Demonstrations and outdoing people as to who will jump higher will only accomplish that the demagogues will be discredited. Mr. Moric was recently attacked by members of his own party on the grounds that he is a Jew baptized a Protestant, that he is a traitor to the Slovak nation because he gained too few mayoral positions for his party. Well, he gained only a few because he did not win in the elections....

Refutation of Baksay's Views on Foreign Trade

92CH0135A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Slovak 25 Oct 91 p 9

[Article by Eng. Milan Jadud, Bratislava: "The Numbers on Foreign Trade in a Somewhat Different Light—A Refutation of the Views of Minister Baksay"—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The interest of the population of the Czech and of the Slovak Republics is concentrated upon the question of the upcoming nature of our constitutional arrangement, an arrangement which should be appropriate to the interests of the citizens of both republics. For such an important decision, it is necessary to provide citizens with qualified, objective information which makes it possible for them to form their own opinions regarding the decisions pertinent to the future of our republics.

To present citizens today with economic and other information with the goal of frightening them, of creating a catastrophic scenario, is more than irresponsible, particularly if the highest representative of the economic sphere—the minister—decides to proceed in this manner.

The views of Jozef Baksay, minister of foreign trade, as published in *HOSPODARSKE NOVINY* on 30 September in a contribution which was intended to provide food for thought and asked the question as to how much an independent state would cost, are truly only his own views, despite the fact that, in the conclusion of the article, he states that he is "convinced that the absolute majority of the citizens of the CSFR are wise Europe-oriented people who wish to see a federation without any kind of arrogation of possessions." A substantial portion of the qualified economists in this Slovak Republic (and certainly not only in the Slovak Republic) entertain a fundamentally different view with respect to this tendentious information.

Within the economy, foreign trade represents one of the principal sources of national income; in the CSFR, it accounts for more than 25 percent of its formation. The institutional structure of organizations which engaged in foreign trade to a decisive extent was not forged with the goal of creating conditions for a balanced and economically justified distribution of the creation and utilization of these resources for the individual republics. Revenues—profits, taxes, customs duties, etc.—destined to be revenues for the state budget, were, to a decisive extent, created and paid in the Czech Republic. The federation was unable to solve the problem of distributing these resources in such a way as to avoid economic imbalances in the budgets of the Czech Republic and of the Slovak Republic. This economic imbalance is, today, one of the principal open questions.

The institutional sphere of the organizations was created, to a decisive extent, in the Czech Republic, particularly in Prague. In the Slovak Republic, the first independent organizations were not created until after 1968, or 1969, as federally directed organizations—a status that prevails to this day. The jurisdictional laws have thus far made it impossible to solve this economically open problem.

Using the results for the year 1989 (the last year for which cumulative data for the CSFR are available), we can actually verify the numbers that constitute food for thought:

| | |
|--|--------------------|
| Turnover in foreign trade for all of CSFR | Kcs439,330 million |
| Foreign trade turnover achieved by enterprises located in Slovak Republic | Kcs51,962 million |
| Percentage share of total CSFR volume | 11.8% |
| Economic results—profits created as a result of foreign trade turnover for all of CSFR | Kcs8,097 million |
| Paid to state budgets | Kcs7,287 million |
| Percentage | 90.0% |
| Budget of Czech Republic received | Kcs6,427 million |
| Budget of Slovak Republic received | Kcs860 million |

The share of the Slovak Republic in the foreign trade turnover of the CSFR is running at a long-term average of 30-35 percent. The share of the resources allocated to the budget of the Slovak Republic does not even attain 12 percent, something which clearly indicates that, in the long term, the budget of the Czech Republic, and particularly the budget of the city of Prague, have enjoyed an influx of resources which is 20 percent higher than is economically justified. Thus, the budget of the Czech Republic received 35 billion korunas [Kcs] more over the last 20 years based on profits. The other financial payments—customs duties, sales taxes, and other supplemental payments—do not exceed the above quantity by the same multiples.

Information available to foreign trade employees in Slovakia does not contain data expressing gains based on activities which the minister designates as "the native commercial representative network." It is truly interesting that the minister only lists the operational costs of these establishments. Economic results are probably a part of the "state secret kept by the minister." This also is one of the well-aimed items of disinformation which lacks at least the basic information regarding that this attractive sphere employs more than 90 percent of the citizens of the Czech Republic.

I consider it to be purposeful to list several other items of information. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade, in 1989, created FINOP, a special-purpose foreign trade organization worth Kcs10 million. The object of its activities was supposed to be as follows:

- The sale and purchase of shares of joint stock corporations entitled to engage in foreign trade activities.
- Operations connected with the establishment of joint stock corporations.
- Conduct of an agenda involving direct foreign commercial expenditures for the organization of foreign trade.
- Consultation and financial information services for the above activities.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade certainly very clearly recognized the effectivity of financial capital and the benefits of financial transactions, proof of which is the fact that when the privatization project was presented, the property of FINOP was recognized to be worth more than Kcs8 billion. The director general, Milan Masak, can certainly manage to reveal the "secret" of that "financial miracle." The minister of foreign trade certainly only omitted this minor point in his "numbers to provide food for thought" through oversight—perhaps even because these numbers are no longer just numbers to merely contemplate.

Another problem, as listed by the minister, is the recovery of accounts receivable by the CSFR with

respect to its debtors. In the article, there is only an informative mention of Kcs9.7 billion. In another matter, the minister lists the convertibility of the Czechoslovak koruna in free currencies, which was achieved, in 1990, through the "economic-administrative road." He most certainly, only by oversight, neglected to mention that, to this day, the Federal Ministry of Finance has failed to compensate the economically indisputable claim based on the recomputation of foreign exchange accounts receivable and accounts payable for 1990, totaling more than Kcs22 billion. Minister Klaus has thus far made no decision with regard to this matter, despite the fact that he is demonstrating, to the IMF and to the World Bank, a "surplus state budget of the CSFR." This is another way in which political popularity can be achieved at the price of unsolvable financial problems besetting the majority of foreign trade enterprises, which must solve unfavorable financial situations resulting from unpaid claims due the state budget of the CSFR by drawing on operational credits at uneconomical interest rates. All individual and collective attempts on the part of the impacted foreign trade organizations are useless.

I am aware that, in this article, it is not possible to exhaust the entire extent of the numbers providing food for thought from the standpoint of foreign trade. Certainly, a substantial number of the citizens of the Czech and of the Slovak Republics will prove capable, on the basis of their own knowledge and experiences, to responsibly evaluate the importance and the contribution made by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade to the economy of our nations. Today, it is not possible to cast doubt on the qualified and demanding work performed by thousands of employees of foreign trade organizations who are proving that they are able to honorably and bravely operate to the benefit of the economies of their people and their republics.

There exists a realistic path toward the attainment of economic balance, at least in the property area. This is no longer only a matter for politicians. Economic questions can and must be decided not only by qualified specialists, who are primarily active in the economic sphere. Their irreplaceable position in the economies of the republics can, in no event, be replaced by a referendum. The citizen has the right and the obligation to decide, with his vote, on constitutional matters. In no country do citizens decide on economic questions by popular vote—by a referendum. A democratic state has a government and economic ministries which act as the highest institutions for the economic sphere. In his article, the minister of foreign trade appeals to freedom, democracy, justice, and social rights. These attributes can be asserted only in a state in which two sovereign republics—the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic—decide voluntarily to establish a joint state unit to which they voluntarily cede a part of their jurisdictions which are essential to their further coexistence.

Consultant Advises Effective Use of Kcs50 Billion
92CH0135B Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 1 Nov 91 p 9

[Article by Eng. Stanislav Vacha, general manager of the Eurovia Consulting Company: "Is Kcs50 Billion Enough for Revival? The Actual Problem of Our Economy"—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] In the first week of October, the Financial Council of the CSFR recommended to the Funds of National Property that they transfer some 50 billion korunas [Kcs] to selected banks as a way to rid enterprises which have a future of debt. This is undoubtedly a positive step, even though it is late. These are funds which our state as yet does not have, but hopes to obtain as proceeds from the sale of state properties involved in large-scale privatization. This step involves several questions. What can these Kcs50 billion do to help enterprises? How should the money be handled so as to result in maximum national economic gain?

The actual problem afflicting our economy is based on poor-quality and expensive products which are marketed with inadequate intensity in domestic as well as foreign markets.

However, the quality of products, their price, and the commercial activities of enterprises are the result of the effects of deeper causes: an unsuitable structure of production and the inadequate quality and labor intensity in enterprises, including—and principally—management work.

The cure for this fundamental problem is very simple, in principle:

- Separate the enterprises from the state and force them to live and develop on their own resources. Also, do not take results from well-managed enterprises and pour them into poorly managed enterprises, which turn them into a loss.
- Expose independently managed enterprises to competition which will force them to either produce products at the European or world level or go bankrupt and transfer their resources, funds, and personnel to those enterprises which prove capable of making efficient use of them.

To consistently separate enterprises from the state means to privatize them and to create hard pressure within them, on the basis of the interests of specific owners, to be profitable and to achieve overall prosperity.

To expose our manufacturers to competition cannot be accomplished in any other way except by opening our economy and that cannot be assured in any other way except if it is accompanied by the convertibility of our currency.

Conditions for the Effectiveness of Reform Strategy

In my opinion, there is no rational alternative to the principled correct strategy for our reform. However, this does not mean that, within its framework, there are no better or worse specific tactical variations. The specific economic policy, for the present, tends to be leaning more toward a poorly rational specification of the correct strategy for economic reform. Primarily, it has proven incapable of correctly assessing the opportunities and reactions of enterprises to its measures, to correctly select the "degree of hardness" and the timing of individual steps, permitting the adoption of timely essential corrections. The policy tends to accuse enterprises of "incorrect" conduct, despite the fact that it is frequently the cause for such conduct. The responsible creators of economic policy are not always aware that they are the ones who are also responsible for the "incorrect" conduct of enterprises; they have a broad arsenal of instruments that are used to bring about this conduct or facilitate it through their use.

In our economic policy, there is a certain theoretical a prioriism, based on the consistent assertion of measures adopted in accordance with monetary theory, no matter what the consequences. Frequently, the impression arises that, in our economic policy, we are more concerned with the assertion of a certain theoretical concept than with actual economic results. Our national economists know little about our enterprises, they do not analyze their actual conduct sufficiently, and do little advance testing with regard to the anticipated reaction of the enterprises. They are then surprised by the fruits of their well-intentioned measures.

Specific national economic decisions should contain corrections based on the following facts:

1. The management of our enterprises is more inclined, for the present, to manage in a "maintenance" manner, rather than offensively. It is capable of adapting even to the gradual dismissal of personnel and restriction of production. To a great extent, management has adopted a strategy of survival at any price. A restrictive economic policy has brought enterprises, managed in this manner, to actually engage in enterprise "restriction," instead of provoking them toward greater prosperity or having them go bankrupt.

2. Some enterprises have already succeeded in separating themselves from the surviving mediocrity. They are conducting themselves like true "growth centers," but their pace is virtually undiscernible. They are kept in mediocrity by various ties to other enterprises, including the burden of secondary insolvency, a high degree of inherited indebtedness, by an incapable banking system, etc. No one knows these growth centers; economic policy does not devote any attention to them, nor does it support them. This duty of our national economists, which is, moreover, proclaimed in the scenario of the economic reform, is being rejected by such phrases as: "The state must not intervene in the functioning of

market forces" and "It is difficult to recognize prospering enterprises during the transition period."

3. Some enterprises, which have vegetated for a long time and have mismanaged their own as well as any national property, continue to receive credits which they do not pay off, they do not pay their suppliers, and drag behind them entire chain reactions of secondary insolvency caused by them, and are making serious endeavors to have their previous debts expunged—to become debt-free. Again, they are not recognized and their activities are not terminated energetically as a result of directed bankruptcy.

4. For the present, the pressure by owners upon management of enterprises is ineffective and, judging by the progress of privatization, it cannot be anticipated that it will assert itself much before the end of next year. Another year could be lost as a result of inadequate entrepreneurial activities on the part of enterprises suffering from inertia and as a result of the conduct of their management.

These facts are determining factors behind the efforts to "bring some movement" to the economy, that is to say, to the system of mutually interconnected enterprises.

How To Connect the Reform With Economic Prosperity

The goal of economic reform—the assertion of an efficient market economy and the assurance of prosperity for the national economy in every phase, including the current phase—must be coordinated. It is not possible to permit the excuse that the economic reform is some kind of cost to be charged against the next prosperity in the long run, that it is a necessary period of economic depression which will be followed by prosperity. Even if this were the case, this expenditure is already exhausted, and it is essential for positive forces to assert themselves—forces the economic reform has created and will create.

From the standpoint of the national economy, the following is necessary:

- Maintain an appropriately restrictive policy which would prevent excessive inflation and will result in tolerable pressure being exerted upon all economic entities.
- Reduce and maintain a reasonable interest rate, so as to stimulate economic activity on the part of enterprises.
- Make the limited financial resources available, particularly through the form of liberal and advantageous credits, including possible state guarantees for high-risk credits, to the best enterprises for the best entrepreneurial intentions.
- Terminate the activities of enterprises which have no future and which are not prospering by directed bankruptcy proceedings and free up their resources.
- Speed up privatization.

- Use all means at hand to elevate the level and position of enterprise management as a decisive force which interprets economic policy inward toward the enterprise, which reacts to threats and opportunities either offensively or adapts to the given status.

In this transitional period, the state cannot stand aside and cannot permit "only the market" to function. This is not a matter in which the state would negate the impact of market forces or deform them, but, rather, the state would strengthen and accelerate them. The discussion of this matter cannot be conducted at a general level and cannot be rejected by generalizing arguments that state officials are not competent in this area, that the market, in the transitional period, does not act with adequate purity, etc.

How To Proceed With Respect To Ridding Enterprises of Their Debts

The indebtedness of enterprises is a manifestation reflecting the consequences of the previous practices of taking the internally generated capital from enterprises, as well as the past arbitrary decisions regarding their investments based on credits, as well as their past and present low degree of prosperity, caused by a number of internal and external factors. There is no point at all here in discussing guilt and merit. There is only one national economically justified approach to this problem: For what purpose will the resources which will be made available to enterprises in this their hour of need be utilized and what will the consequences be for the enterprise and for the economy?

Given the overall estimated indebtedness of our enterprises of Kcs500 billion, the sum of Kcs50 billion is inadequate, but important. If it is to be used as a factor in reviving the economy, then each koruna must be made available to those who are the carriers and guarantors of this revival and not a single koruna must be used to help those who are incapable survive. In the given situation, it is the lesser of the evils that the decision regarding these funds will be entrusted to the commercial banks, but operating regulations should guide them in their as yet inadequately developed entrepreneurial capabilities.

The banks should not utilize any of this money for those who have the greatest amount of debt and who, thus, need to be "rid of debt" the most. Before a bank writes off any debt, it should have adequate information regarding the fact that this will help a promising enterprise which has an outlook for prosperity. On a priority basis, this Kcs50 billion should be used for developmental targets, that is to say, for further credits to those who have the most efficient entrepreneurial interests and whose past results provide promise that they will also prove capable of fulfilling these intentions.

It would be a mistake if this Kcs50 billion were used with the goal of "facilitating payment contacts," rather than with the goal of strengthening nascent centers of future prosperity. In the banks, these funds should be subject to contests according to previously established criteria.

A Program To Support the Development of the Best

In addition to the Kcs50 billion, all opportunities at the disposal of the state, the banks, the consulting organizations, and other entities should be used to provide liberal support for the best and most promising enterprises. Such a program should encompass particularly the following:

- Support for efficient exports (advantaged credits, insurance, taxes).
- Priority advantaged loans for the most efficient entrepreneurial projects.
- Support for investments by providing advantaged financing and write-off conditions.
- Creation of a club of the best enterprises (TOP 100) and consulting them on economic policy.
- Systematic evaluation of our best enterprises, studying and publishing their results, and disseminating their experiences.

Carnogursky's Criticism of Liberalism Answered

92CH0132A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak
29 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Martin Kvetko: "Liberalism as a Social Threat?"]

[Text] In his speech at a seminar organized for the 100th anniversary of the encyclical "Rerum Novarum" in New York, the prime minister of the Slovak government, Dr. Jan Carnogursky, spoke of the importance of this encyclical for the resolution of social problems. He also spoke about the new threat to modern society represented by liberalism. He stated that liberalism threatens the development of the individual and society, and therefore called upon Catholic social science to fight against the threat coming from the side of liberalism.

One can understand Dr. Carnogursky's reservations as a Catholic politician who is concerned about the philosophical differentiation between the Catholic conception of social problem resolution and the liberal conception. However, shifting the reevaluation of both policies to the practical political arena in a democratic system is questionable at best. And unfortunately, Carnogursky's position as a seminar speaker has become integrated into political practice whether he likes it or not, and regardless of whether he spoke what he really thinks or not. In any event the press, which had to notice such a sharp statement of views on current problems, began to carry reports characterizing the speech as a harsh attack on liberalism, which is after all also a part of our political scene.

Can one, then, accept the notion that after the defeat of socialism liberalism also represents a threat to society?

What is the basis of Dr. Carnogursky's contention? He states that liberalism, as a philosophy, makes decisions without regard to moral criteria, that it stays in the economic realm of the decision without regard for the

social or moral consequences, that it threatens the development of the individual, disrupts the balance between different social classes, disconnects a person from moral values and faith, and as a result creates an intellectual refuge for former communists. At this last accusation the attentive observer has to laugh, when he realizes where the refuge for former communists currently lies in our country. In the first place, I would hazard a guess that it was, and continues to be, liberalism that laid down the foundations for political pluralism in modern society. Without liberalism it is scarcely possible to imagine the existence of democratic pluralism, because when we look at the recent past we learn that wherever attempts have been made to create a political and governmental system based on a single philosophical and political concept, whether rightist or leftist, the society has reached a dead end, found itself in a situation with no way out. Such societies have searched, and continue to search for their way out in a revival of the liberal concept of a social system. However, liberalism in its own philosophical and political conception is based on the recognition that the problems accumulated in a society—disorder, chaos, poverty, hunger, and fear—are the result of the departure from liberalism.

When we start from the beginning we must notice that liberalism places priority emphasis on the person as a being capable of thinking and acting independently. Liberalism only offers a person the conditions for this independent thought and action, so that the individual can accept responsibility for his actions. This is the direct opposite of the contention that liberalism would restrict the development of the individual. From personality and human existence liberalism shifts to the family, which it considers to be the foundation of society. And if the family is and must be the foundation of human society, a liberal system must also provide healthy cultural, economic, and social conditions for the development of the family.

The most frequent mistake noted by critics of liberalism is that it tolerates or supports decisions in the area of economics without regard for the social or moral consequences of those decisions. The fact is, however, that the "Oxford Liberal Manifesto" of 1947 emphasizes the right to private property ownership and the right of individual entrepreneurship, thereby setting down the foundation for economic freedom, without which there cannot be political freedom. The manifesto also notes however that the welfare of the society must be paramount and must be protected against exploitation by power and special interests. It emphasizes that the rights, responsibilities and interests of labor and capital are interrelated, that in economics there must be cooperation between employees and employers. This situation

then guarantees that economic decisions will not be made without considering their social consequences.

The "Liberal Manifesto" calls upon all classes of citizens to place their abilities at the service of humanity, and to devote their efforts to meeting the spiritual and material needs of all people, without distinction.

Liberalism therefore calls upon all social classes to band together cooperatively to meet their needs rather than engaging in class struggle.

Liberalism demands respect for human dignity, which means the right of equal opportunity for all, the protection of the individual from life threatening material dangers, and the right to healthy social development. Under modern liberalism an entrepreneur cannot act in the interest of his profits, if his prosperity threatens the health and stability of society. The fact that liberalism does not place a call to faith and religious conviction at the head of its program, but proclaims religious freedom and freedom of conscience, does not mean that it ignores or rejects the moral principles and values derived from Christianity.

Liberalism rejects a struggle with those philosophical and political concepts which, like liberalism, have as part of their program the building of a democratic system consisting of a government of all classes. Rather it advocates competition, with the objective of the conflict-free development of society, its happiness and the happiness of the individual.

Demographics Reflect Developments in Federation

92CH0109A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 25 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Eng. Jan Vachel: "Czecho-Slovak Relations in Light of Demographic Data"]

[Text] The demographic dimension has been missing from discussions of our national legal organization. This is certainly because little is known about it. We are therefore publishing statistical data that will make it possible to compare the evolution of demographic indicators for our national republics in various time periods over the last roughly 120 years.

These figures concern mainly increases in population, the relative shares of total population throughout the federation, migration within the federation and outside it, and the development of the nationality composition of the population in the Czech Republic [CR] and Slovak Republic [SR]. Table 1 provides a basic orientation. This table groups data into three periods: prior to World War I, the interwar period, and the postwar period.

Table 1
Population Growth on Current CSFR Territory, 1870-1989

| | 1870 | 1914 | 1920 | 1937 | 1948 | 1989 |
|---------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Population (in thousands) | | | | | | |
| CR | 7,699 | 10,284 | 9,978 | 10,889 | 8,893 | 10,364 |
| SR | 2,482 | 3,129 | 3,001 | 3,540 | 3,446 | 5,275 |
| CSFR | 10,181 | 13,413 | 12,979 | 14,429 | 12,339 | 15,639 |
| Percent of CSFR total | | | | | | |
| CR | 75.6 | 76.7 | 76.9 | 75.5 | 72.1 | 66.3 |
| SR | 24.4 | 23.3 | 23.1 | 24.5 | 27.9 | 33.7 |

Population growth on the current CSFR territory from 1870-1989 from this viewpoint clearly shows that the most important demographic indicator, relative population growth, was basically the same in both national republics between 1870 and 1914, was greater in the Slovak Republic than in the Czech Republic by a factor of 2.3 between the wars, and was greater in the Slovak Republic by a factor of 2.6 between 1948 and 1989. The other basic demographic indicator, population growth, improved significantly in the SR after the creation of the joint country.

Population shifts between our two republics represent an exceptionally interesting demographic indicator. The figure can be derived, however, from the available statistical data only using a complex calculation. Comparing natural population growth (the difference between births and deaths) with the actual increase (the difference between the population at the beginning and the end of a period, arrived at either by a census or the balancing method) yields a figure on net movements (those who moved out plus those that moved in). This method entails potential, otherwise small, errors and omissions when calculating natural growth, in other words the status of the population. This must be kept in mind, because it means that this net figure cannot be taken as precise, but rather as an approximation. We therefore are presenting only the general findings here, rather than the entire calculation and its methodology.

The movement figure for the SR for the 1948-89 period, after subtracting for internal migration to the CR, indicates that emigration from the SR to countries outside of the CSFR is significantly lower than emigrations from the CR to other countries: 10,000 from the SR and 530,000 from the CR. Between 1948 and 1989 the SR even had a positive movement balance with outside countries (resulting from the repatriation of Slovaks from Hungary and Romania). Only in the 1969-89 period was this balance negative. This shows that after world war II previous economic pressures forcing mass emigrations disappeared. This at the same time means that the "brain drain" to foreign countries from the CR was much greater than that experienced by the SR.

To this it must be added that a movement balance calculated in the above way does not agree, with serious discrepancies, with data on foreign emigration published in the Federal Statistics Office [FSU] yearbooks. For political reasons these publications did not consider so-called illegal emigration, which in the surveyed periods was very high. Official data places the deficit caused by movement abroad for the entire 1948-89 period at 17,000, 14,000 for the CR and 3,000 for the SR. In the interest of truth, the FSU should publish revised emigration data, covering the entire period beginning in 1948.

The development of the nationality structure of the CSFR as a whole and in each republic is summarized in Table 2.

Table 2
Nationality Structure of the CR and SR Populations

| | 1921 | | 1937 | | 1950 | | 1989 | |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| | Thousands | Percent | Thousands | Percent | Thousands | Percent | Thousands | Percent |
| CR Total population | 10,002 | 100.0 | 10,889 | 100.0 | 8,925 | 100.0 | 10,364 | 100.0 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | |
| Czechs | 6,767 | 67.6 | 7,460 | 68.5 | 8,362 | 93.7 | 9,744 | 94.0 |
| Slovaks | 16 | 0.2 | 65 | 0.6 | 267 | 3.0 | 425 | 4.1 |
| Other nationalities | 3,219 | 32.2 | 3,364 | 30.9 | 296 | 3.3 | 195 | 1.9 |
| SR Total population | 3,005 | 100.0 | 3,540 | 100.0 | 3,463 | 100.0 | 5,275 | 100.0 |

Table 2
Nationality Structure of the CR and SR Populations (Continued)

| | 1921 | | 1937 | | 1950 | | 1989 | |
|-----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| | Thousands | Percent | Thousands | Percent | Thousands | Percent | Thousands | Percent |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | |
| Slovaks | 1,961 | 65.2 | 2,374 | 67.1 | 3,003 | 86.7 | 4,574 | 86.7 |
| Czechs | 74 | 2.5 | 161 | 4.5 | 40 | 1.2 | 64 | 1.2 |
| Other nationalities | 970 | 32.3 | 1,005 | 28.4 | 420 | 12.1 | 637 | 12.1 |
| CSFR Total population | 13,007 | 100.0 | 14,429 | 100.0 | 12,388 | 100.0 | 15,639 | 100.0 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | |
| Czechs | 6,841 | 52.6 | 7,621 | 52.8 | 8,402 | 67.8 | 9,808 | 62.7 |
| Slovaks | 1,977 | 15.2 | 2,439 | 16.9 | 3,270 | 26.4 | 4,999 | 32.0 |
| Other nationalities | 4,189 | 32.2 | 4,369 | 30.3 | 716 | 5.8 | 832 | 5.3 |

Statistics on the nationality composition of the population indicate that in the CR Slovaks have increased steadily as a percentage of the total population. In the SR between the wars Czechs as a percentage of the total population increased from 2.5 percent in 1924 to 4.5 percent in 1937, then declined again, stabilizing at 1.2 percent of the total population. In 1937, 100,000 more Czechs lived in Slovakia than Slovaks lived in Bohemia. By 1989, 360,000 more Slovaks lived in Bohemia than Czechs in Slovakia. This shows that in the pre-Munich period migration between the CR and SR was not as active as in the years after world war II, and that movement from Bohemia to Slovakia predominated.

Statistics of that time, however, did not record this migratory trend.

Looking at Czechoslovakia as a whole, the greatest percentage population increase for the 1921-89 period was recorded by the Slovak nationality, with an increase of 153 percent. The population of the Czech nationality increased by 43 percent, while the population of other nationalities decreased by 80 percent. Slovaks as a percentage of the total population doubled, from 15 to 32 percent, while Czechs as a percentage of the total increased by 10 points, from 53 to 63 percent. Other nationalities decreased as a percentage of the total from 32 to 5 percent. This relatively rapid, undisputed rise of Slovakia is confirmed by the more detailed data in Table 3.

Table 3
Development of Selected Demographic Indicators in the CR and SR, 1920-89

| Czech Republic | | | | |
|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Period | Birthrate | Natural Growth | Infant Mortality | Divorces per 100 Weddings |
| | Per 1,000 Population | | | |
| 1920-29 | 22.2 | 7.2 | 144.3 | 4.4 |
| 1930-38 | 16.3 | 3.2 | 108.6 | 6.6 |
| 1950-59 | 17.7 | 7.2 | 36.9 | 15.4 |
| 1960-69 | 14.4 | 3.6 | 21.0 | 19.6 |
| 1970-79 | 17.5 | 5.1 | 18.8 | 26.5 |
| 1980-89 | 13.3 | 0.6 | 13.5 | 36.8 |
| Slovak Republic | | | | |
| Period | Birthrate | Natural Growth | Infant Mortality | Divorces per 100 Weddings |
| | Per 1,000 Population | | | |
| 1920-29 | 33.2 | 14.5 | 173.2 | 1.8 |
| 1930-38 | 24.9 | 10.2 | 152.7 | 2.9 |
| 1950-59 | 26.4 | 16.8 | 60.0 | 5.6 |
| 1960-69 | 19.3 | 11.2 | 26.4 | 8.2 |
| 1970-79 | 19.9 | 10.4 | 23.5 | 12.4 |
| 1980-89 | 17.3 | 7.2 | 16.6 | 19.3 |

A comparison of the demographic data for both national republics indicates that the SR has significantly closed the gap with the CR in many categories. It still has a higher rate of population growth, due to higher birth and higher natural growth rates. The life expectancy indicator for both sexes in 1932 was 55.6 years for the CR and 49.9 years in the SR, a difference of 5.7 years in favor of the CR. In 1988 the life expectancy in the CR was 71.7 years, and in the SR 71.3 years, meaning that the advantage of the CR had been reduced to 0.4 years. In both the SR and the CR indicators of negative phenomena, such as the divorce rate, have increased.

The Census Predicts

On 3 March 1991 the seventh census of people, houses, and apartments since the founding of independent Czechoslovakia was started. Its precise results will be available next year. Preliminary results published by the FSU include data on the nationality composition of the federation and both national republics. Percentage data reflect the numbers of permanent residents as of the final day: a population of 15,567,666 in the CSFR, 10,298,731 in the CR, 5,268,935 in the SR. Women

account for 51.3 percent of the population of the federation, and 51.3 percent of the CR population and 51.4 percent of the SR population.

Following accepted census practices the count was made using the self-counting method, meaning that individuals filled out the appropriate census forms. The nationality indicator (as well as the religious faith indicator) could both be filled out according to personal conviction, as provided for in the List of Basic Human Rights and Freedoms. For the first time, people could declare a nationality of gypsy (in previous censuses, gypsies could declare themselves of Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, or other nationalities), as well as Moravian, or Silesian.

In comparison with expert estimates of the number of gypsies (300,000 in the CR and 500,000 in the SR), significantly smaller numbers of citizens declared themselves of the gypsy nationality than are recorded in 1989 statistical yearbooks. The same was true of Slovaks living in the CR and of Czechs living in the SR. One can assume that this is because of fears that if the unified country falls apart such people might be sent back to their home villages. It would be appropriate to test this hypothesis with a sociological survey.

Justice Minister on Government's Retribution Plan

92CH0120A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
31 Oct 91 p 9

[Interview with Minister of Justice Istvan Balsai and Istvan Varga, adviser to the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by E. Peter Kovary; place and date not given: "Closing the Book on the Past"]

[Text] Minister of Justice Istvan Balsai and Istvan Varga, director of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) steering committee, recently said in Oroshaza that we must close the book on the past, because otherwise there will be no change of regime. Yet the only way to close the book on the past is by rendering justice. I discussed this topic with them.

Most Rigorous Guarantees

[Kovary] Under the agreement that emerged during coalition talks, all three parties will prepare a detailed scheme for administering justice. Alongside the Justitia plan, a new party program—a new political concept—has surfaced to which parliament will grant statutory force. The law is beginning to "take effect": cases must be found to demonstrate the law's legitimacy. What is your opinion of this?

[Varga] Let us forget the Justitia item, because many misconceptions are attached to it. Let us speak instead about rendering justice, about a program for rendering justice. But here, too, misunderstandings have arisen. There is talk about witch-hunts, and a portion of the press sounds a hysterical note. But it boils down to nothing more than closing the book on the past. In the case of the most serious crimes, which could not be prosecuted in the past for political reasons, legal proceedings must be instituted. We propose that criminal liability be limited to a narrow circle and that guilt be declared on the basis of evidence, not politics. What we are concerned with here is murder and treason. But even in these cases we, unlike our neighbors, suggest unlimited leniency when it comes to meting out punishment.

[Balsai] The biggest mistake would be to think that a witch-hunt could be launched on the basis of a parliamentary decree. The law itself lays down the most rigorous guarantees for maintaining lawfulness. The presumption of innocence, the public trial, the crucial requirement that guilt be declared only on the basis of evidence—these are the guarantees that make it impossible to fabricate political cases. Unfortunately, there are real cases that do not have to be fabricated. This method of rendering justice is not unconstitutional: It does not run afoul of internationally accepted standards for a constitutional state. Indeed, intervention against the extinguishment of life—together with protection of the right to life—is part of what it means to be a constitutional state. I would add that for lack of proof the most serious cases may end in acquittal.

Does the Situation Improve?

[Kovary] Murder is murder, no matter under which system or slogan it is committed. But how are legal proceedings instituted? Do you depend on someone to lodge a complaint, or do you wait for the lists that appear in the White Book?

[Balsai] There will probably be complaints lodged, and all of them must be dealt with, but there is enough material available for us to launch trials and investigations. Let me mention, for example, the 1945 case of murders in Gyomor.

[Varga] Complete misunderstanding surrounds the White Book. When we decided to prepare it, there were no lists, no preparation of lists. Actual events must be gathered and described, and the forged history of 40 years must be revealed. We asked Domokos Kosary for his help, and the press went and asked him if he was willing to cooperate in preparing lists. Naturally, he balked at that. Only when I spoke with him personally and told him what was at issue did it become clear to him that we were asking for professional help. The White Book will be completed, but it will differ from the Pofosz or Recski books, which may have serious legal consequences because they lack workmanship.

Legal Consequences

[Kovary] Many who suffered flagrant injustice—for example, Erzsebet Nagy, daughter of Imre Nagy—advise us not to let the administration of justice generate an atmosphere of revenge in a country of declining health. Do you agree with this statement?

[Balsai] I agree with Erzsebet Nagy. The point is precisely that we should use legal means to heal what can be healed. It would be a shame to forget that to return church property and dismantle state property is to render justice: These issues form a unified whole in the change of regime. We must be aware of this because then no one will view our steps as measures to improve the general health.

[Varga] In my opinion, the situation in this country is not deteriorating, but improving. We are making progress. But we must ultimately distinguish between good and bad. Because what will we say to our children if they see that the person we shoot lives in a basement on 4,000 forints a month and the person who does the shooting receives a monthly pension of 20,000 forints?

'Neofascists' Said To Have Attacked Gypsies

91CH0153A Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian
9 Nov 91 p 17

[Article by Elemer Magyar: "Neofascists in Eger"]

[Text] Although the reason for it is unknown, it is a fact that Eger has become a center of Hungarian neofascists. Recent events also bear this out.

Last September about 100-150 young people, mostly juveniles armed with sticks, chains, and cables, went from Eger's downtown district to the housing development. They assaulted several persons on the way, shouted anti-Gypsy slogans, and then attacked Gyula Bader, 37, father of three children, who was walking his dog; he tried to get away but was caught in the ground-floor hallway of his apartment building where he was beaten and kicked. Despite several desperate calls for help, the police did not intervene, and were unable to identify the perpetrators during the subsequent investigation. (At the order of the chief prosecutor, a 14-year-old boy was brought to court because of racial statements he had made.)

The next day Gypsies chased some persons thought to be skinheads, and vandalized their cars. The police filed charges against 10 persons—mostly with clean police records—resulting in indictments.

Last winter, the first larger meeting of skinheads took place in Eger, in a restaurant rented for this purpose. A Holy Crown Society activist was also among the participants. According to information received from the local prosecutor's office, this society exerts great influence on the skinheads and helps them build and develop their organization.

The next action took place in mid-February of this year. Confectionery student Csaba B., 15, heading home with his brother and friend from a disco, was attacked on the square facing the one-time Pioneers Building. Amidst provocative and anti-Gypsy comments, his brother was hit and he himself was stabbed in the thigh. No court trial has yet taken place.

Next, the May festivity in Szepasszonyvolgy [Valley of the F. ir Lady] was disturbed on 1 May. Persons from Budapest and Miskolc, as well as from abroad—from

Austria and Germany—also appeared among the 100-150 skinheads. They also shouted anti-Gypsy and pronouncedly fascist slogans. Thousands of people witnessed them raise their arms and shout, "Sieg Heil!" They assaulted several Gypsy musicians, and then forcefully tried to hinder the performance on the improvised stage of the local Gypsy group that is trying to preserve traditions. The intervening police officers were also insulted, resulting in criminal charges filed for violence against official persons. This time not only instruments for beating but also various fascist relics, such as pictures of Hitler and swastikas, were also confiscated from the perpetrators.

Further anti-Gypsy actions took place in Eger on 28 September and 4 October. An unidentified Gypsy man from Ozd was extensively kicked in front of the Kazamata restaurant, which was followed by a rampage on the street next to the swimming pool, an area where mostly Gypsies live.

Most recently, in mid-October, Gypsy youth—mostly girls—heading home from the movies, have been attacked. One of them stayed behind to allow her friends to get away. She was beaten and kicked, and had to be taken to a hospital by an ambulance.

During interrogation, the skinheads did not even deny that their objective was to drive out the Gypsies from the downtown area. In order to do this, they have had regular armed "patrols."

Early in the following morning, without prior notice, investigators took in the victims—most of them juveniles—for interrogation and confrontation and released them during the afternoon hours.

The Gypsies are frightened and hardly allow their children to go out on the street. They do not believe that the police are willing and able to guard their safety.

Breakdown of Sejm Seats by Political Party

92EP0082A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
31 Oct-1 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by PAP correspondent "(FF)": "Apportionment of Sejm Seats: 62 for the Democratic Union, 60 for the Alliance of the Democratic Left"]

[Text] Loading the computer with incomplete data resulted in that the results of the elections cannot be made official until this coming Thursday. Fewer seats than had originally been estimated may be apportioned to NSZZ Solidarity, the Polish Party of Beer Lovers, or Christian Democracy.

The State Electoral Commission discovered an error when apportioning the seats from the Wielkopolska list. One of the national lists of candidates was credited with votes from a district which failed to satisfy the so-called requirement of linkage to Article 101 of the Electoral Law. That article stipulates that seats from the national list are apportioned on the basis of the summation of the ballots cast for a given party only in the districts from which at least one candidate is named on the national list for that party.

The State Electoral Commission failed to identify the list to which the error pertained. Calculations by ZYCIE WARSZAWY indicate that compared with the advance estimates which we are publishing, one seat may be forfeited by either NSZZ Labor Solidarity or the Polish Party of Beer Lovers. Were that error to concern the Christian Democracy, it would have forfeited both seats allocated to it from the national list.

Still, the verification of figures by the State Electoral Commission will most likely not affect the unofficial complete results of the elections, aside from reapportioning one or two seats. According to these unofficial results, the largest number of seats was won by the Democratic Union—62 (51 in districts and 11 from the national list). The Alliance of the Democratic Left won 60 seats (50 in districts and 10 from the national list), and Electoral Catholic Action, 49 (42 and 7, respectively).

The next largest winners were, in this order, the "Program Alliance" Polish Peasant Party, 48 (41 and 7 seats), the Confederation for an Independent Poland, 45 (38 and 7), the Center Accord, 44 (37 and 7), the Liberal-Democratic Congress, 37 (31 and 6), the Peasant Alliance, 28 (23 and 5), NSZZ Solidarity, 27 (23 and 4), the Polish Party of Beer Lovers, 16 (13 and 3), and the Christian Democracy, 7 (5 and 2). This ends the list of the parties which gained additional seats from their national lists.

Six seats in electoral districts were won by the German minority, and 4 seats each by the Polish Western Union, the Party of Christian Democrats, and Labor Solidarity,

and 3 seats each were won by the Union for Real Politics and the "X" Party, followed by 2 seats for the Movement for Silesian Autonomy.

Only 1 mandate each was won by the National Electoral Committees of the Democratic-Social Movement and the Democratic Party.

Among the groupings standing for national lists, no seats were won by the National Party, the NSZZ of the Police, the Coalition of Green and Ecological Parties, and the Belorussian Electoral Committee.

The remaining 36 seats were apportioned among representatives of regional and local groupings and movements.

The largest proportion of votes, on the national scale, 12.35 percent, was won by the UD [Democratic Union], followed by 12.02 percent for the SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left], 8.80 percent for the WAK [Electoral Catholic Action], 8.73 percent for the POC [Citizens' Center Accord], 8.69 percent for the PSL "SP" ["Program Alliance" Polish Peasant Party], 7.65 for the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], 7.48 percent for the KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress], 5.41 percent for the Peasant Alliance, 4.93 percent for NSZZ Solidarity, 3.14 percent for the Polish Beer Lovers' Party, and 2.01 percent for Labor Solidarity.

In electoral district no. 1 in Warsaw, seats in the Sejm were won by Jacek Kuron, Bronislaw Geremek, and Andrzej Wielowieyski of the UD; Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jacek Kurczewski, and Pawel Piskorski of the KLD; Adam Glapinski, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and Jan Olszewski of the POC; Aleksander Kwasniewski and Jerzy Wiatr of the SLD; Ryszard Bugaj of Labor Solidarity; Antoni Macierewicz of the WAK; Zbigniew Bujak of the RDS [Social Democratic Movement]; Krzysztof Krol of the KPN; Lech Pruchno Wroblewski of the KPN, and Janusz Rewinski of the Polish Beer Lovers' Party.

In that district the losing candidates included Mikolaj Kozakiewicz who, however, will keep a seat in the Sejm as a candidate from the national list of the "Program Alliance" PSL.

The voter turnout in Warsaw amounted to 53.9 percent. The largest number of votes was won by the district lists of the UD, 18.9 percent, followed by 16.6 percent for the KLD and 14.8 percent for the POC.

Election Results by Parties, Voivodships

92EP0091A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
16-17 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Tomasz Zukowski: "The Electoral Map of Poland"]

[Text] Finally we have the complete results of the parliamentary elections, including the percentages of votes won by the parties in discrete electoral districts. We can

thus see the changes that took place on the electoral map of Poland as compared with the previous elections.

The Geography of Citizenship

June 1989, June 1990, November and December 1990, November 1991. Parliamentary elections, local government elections, two rounds of presidential elections, and again parliamentary elections—this time completely free ones, respectively. Five elections and one geography of voter turnout.

This time, too, the highest voter turnout was in Warsaw and Malopolska (Nowy Sacz, Tarnow, Krakow, Bielsk voivodships), in Wielkopolska, and in Gdansk Pomerania. On the last Sunday in October, longtime traditions of citizenship, thrift, and local government, whose roots reach back to organic work [peaceful promotion of Polish nationalism in partition times] in 19th-century Galicia and in the part of Poland under Prussian occupation, as well as the experience in public activism during the last few decades (Warsaw, Gdansk) decided whether people would go out to vote or stay home.

Who, Where, and How

Now let us consider who the people who went out voted for. The UD [Democratic Union], the leading party on the political scene scored better in the western part of the country and in the big cities: Krakow (top score, 21.1 percent) and Warsaw. On the other hand, it suffered a defeat in "Eastern Wall" [eastern border zone] territory.

The POC [Citizens' Center Accord], the most serious rival of the UD, garnered many votes both in the east and in the west (Diagram 1). But it gained its best results in the area of the traditionally leftist Zagłębie (19.4 percent), Lodz, and Bydgoszcz, while losing the competition for votes in anti-Communist Malopolska and Solidarity-Liberal Gdansk.

The WAK [Electoral Catholic Action] (Diagram 2) scored a definite success in the Ciechanow-Ostroleka-Lomza district (21 percent) and Radom (17.2 percent). But it scored the least in Upper Silesia, the western part of "Congress Poland" (outside Lodz), and in the north of the country.

The POC proved to be most popular among voters in Warsaw Voivodship and the former Galicia (Nowy Sacz and Tarnow voivodships). In eastern and southern Poland it won definitely more votes than in north-western Poland (diagram 3—not reproduced here).

The PSL [Polish Peasant Party] is, understandably, the party of the rural regions. It won the most votes in the area that was formerly part of the Czarist Empire (22.5 percent in the Plock-Skierniewice district) as well as in eastern Galicia.

The KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] gained the most votes in southeastern Poland. The KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress] won in Gdansk Voivodship, Warsaw, and Katowice, but was a big loser in the

rural regions. The Solidarity Peasant Accord won in the western "Congress Poland" (23.5 percent in the Siedlce-Bialsk Podlaska district and 18.8 percent in the Zamosc-Chelm district). And the last of the major parties, Solidarity, scored best in Pomerania (14.2 percent in the Gdansk district and 11.5 percent in the Bydgoszcz district).

The Disbanded Confederation

How has the electoral map of Poland changed compared with the previous elections? Consider in brief that the geography of the "rejection of Communism" in the turning-point elections of 4 June 1989 was decided by the strength of social bonds, the traditions of anti-Communist resistance (both worker traditions of the 1980s and peasant traditions of the 1940's). Wherever people were less fragmented in their views they felt greater solidarity, were aware of alternative values, and supported Solidarity more strongly.

Similarly the geographical differences in the results of last year's Presidential elections were linked to the intensity of the social support of the civic-Solidarity movement in June 1989 and in the local government elections of May 1990.

Much indicates that this time this pattern did not recur. The strength of the Solidarity confederation, the traditions of the struggle against the old system are no longer the principal factor in Polish politics. They have been replaced by such factors as the level of urbanization and industrialization, educational background of voters, and the growth of commodity production in the countryside and the private sector in the cities. "Developed Poland" supported the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress, while "Rural Poland" supported the PSL and the Peasant Accord.

The traditions of the Solidarity confederation of 1989 were this time relegated to a secondary plane, playing a special role in the case of the electorates of Citizens' Center Accord [POC], the KPN, and the Alliance of the Democratic Left. The POC and the KPN proved to be especially popular parties in the regions in which the candidates from "Walesa's Team" had been most strongly supported and the national list opposed. As for the Alliance of the Democratic Left, it was quite obviously the least popular in those regions.

A special place on the electoral map is occupied by the PSL: It has won many votes in the voivodships with weak traditions of resistance which had, on the other hand, favored the famous "Not From Behind the Curtain" in the 1987 referendum.

The level of the integration of local communities and religiosity was this time more strongly linked to the voting for the Alliance of the Democratic Left [SLD]. The SLD was most strongly supported by voters in the voivodships with higher crime rates and lower proportions of churchgoers.

And lastly, one other matter: voters' preferences [in the Presidential elections] a year ago. At that time the SLD could count on the regions supporting Cimoszewicz [post-Communist Party leader] and Tyminski; the PSL, on the regions supporting [peasant leader] Bartoszcze; the UD, on those supporting Mazowiecki; the KPN, on those supporting Moczulski. Center Accord and the KPN scored worst in the areas where Tyminski had enjoyed special popularity.

Thus, the Solidarity confederation has been superseded by a mosaic of parties of differing origin and differing visions of the economy and community life: The divisions of the period of emergence from the old [Communist] system have given way to the divisions linked to the transition to a new order.

Views on Strong Presidential Power Presented

92EP0093A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
8 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Senator Andrzej Celinski by Ewa Szemplinska; place and date not given: "For a Strong Presidency"]

[Text] [Szemplinska] I am interested in three questions: How do you view Poland's political situation after the elections? What are the potential consequences of the relative inability of the political elite to reach compromises (I am thinking here of its lack of skill in reaching an agreement on the question of the scope of concessions and at the same time in explicitly drawing the line at those program planks which may not be abandoned)? And lastly, in the present situation what would you consider to be the optimal solutions?

[Celinski] The results of the elections, which had been roughly anticipated by analysts and critics of the electoral law, are unfavorable. Poland is definitely losing its reputation as a politically stable country and one consistently implementing its economic program. This is happening even if that program fundamentally continues to be implemented, because the results of the elections have undermined the long-term toleration of its implementation, and the preelection attacks on Leszek Balcerowicz's policy also have not helped Poland's image. Lastly the lofty declarations about the abnegation of Communism for the sake of building democracy have lost their power, because the 11th Sejm will after all be full of parliamentarians originating from the former ZSL [Communist-dominated Polish Peasant Party] and the former PZPR [Communists], except that this time they have been elected by public mandate rather than through a political contract. These are extremely unfavorable circumstances that entail the fragmentation of the parliamentary scene as well as what you have mentioned, namely, relative inability to reach compromises and form coalition governments.

But the facts have to be accepted, and attention should be focused on how to utilize this situation sensibly, because the art of politics is to turn defeat into victory.

[Szemplinska] That sounds like pure rhetoric.

[Celinski] No. I am trying to find a solution to a situation which is undoubtedly difficult, and my assessment is also influenced by a concept of government that is specifically tailored to the cultural and traditional methods of the self-organization of Poles for public affairs. Well, I believe that we need a far-reaching economic, social, and personal freedom that has to be combined with strong and efficient rule, especially now in the absence of a foreign enemy against whom Poles find it so easy to unite and organize themselves. In Poland nowadays there is a shortage of the ability to govern with a firm hand.

[Szemplinska] A governance that would imply the threat of a dictatorship or at least of authoritarianism.

[Celinski] But that is not self-evident. A strong rule need not be identified with dictatorship. On the contrary, a weak, vague governance lacking clear decisionmaking procedures, under which decisions become undermined by tergiversations, is the straight road to dictatorship. That is why I do not exclude the possibility that the present difficult situation may serve well to build the structures of an explicitly defined executive branch with extensive powers.

[Szemplinska] How? In the new postelection Sejm it is difficult to find a majority capable of forming a government, and the more so of stabilizing it. Even if now or in the near future a Solidarity, nationalist, or independence coalition is established (which is particularly interesting in a situation in which there is no foreign aggressor), that would clearly be just a political ploy which essentially does not augur a successful and workable government.

[Celinski] I agree. Neither the fragmentation of the parliament nor the level of the ability to resolve disputes and build programs augur well for the parliamentary system. But that is why I find it obvious that the burden of the decisions will shift onto the Belweder [presidential residence]. Following these elections I perceive no other possibility than that the president will appoint a government and executive power will be concentrated in the presidency. In this connection, my hope is that the president's stance will be nonpartisan and he will favor tendencies toward compromise in the contacts between the government and the parliament and, more even, that he will aspire to clearly separate the legislative and executive powers. At present there is not in Poland a consistent division of these powers, and a situation in which government officials (e.g., ministers, voivodes, etc.) sit on the parliamentary benches is additionally blurring that division.

[Szemplinska] That is, we have a presidential-parliamentary system. To you personally is that a choice between institutions or between individuals?

[Celinski] I definitely favor the institutional option, since it is long-term instead of being dependent on a single individual and a single term of office. To avoid any misunderstandings let me make it clear that in the

presidential elections I had voted for Tadeusz Mazowiecki. All the same I would say to those who fear dictatorial ambitions on the part of Lech Walesa that weakening the executive branch for the benefit of the parliament would not at all promote democracy, because the best protection of democracy lies in a close adherence to the electoral calendar and the application of a sensible electoral law. What is more, I do not believe at all that a strong presidency is a necessity dictated by the results of the recent parliamentary elections; no, rather it is a definite advantage which will pay off in the future if Poland is to be an efficiently governed country rather than one sunk in anarchy, torn by conflicts, and drowning in parliamentary disputes. And on observing the political scene and the programs of various parties I perceive that these continue to sound like preelection declarations rather than offering postelection specifics. Even the 11 points presented by the Democratic Union were declamatory rather than inviting discussion and the formation of a coalition.

[Szemplinska] Why? Only the Democratic Union has defined the limits of possible concessions and the conditions for continuing the reforms which must be met in order to join a coalition.

[Celinski] But that is not the language in which a working program for the government can be designed. I do not mean to say thereby that another political party has offered a better proposal. It is the general problem of Polish politicians that they employ either an opaque language, as in the preelection campaign, except that it is no longer bellicose, or the language of political ploys and parliamentary arithmetics. No one, on the other hand, is answering the question of what is to be done, how and on the basis of what timetable, and at what expense. And since I believe that the process whereby the political parties become more civilized and mature will still take a couple or so of years, as will the evolution of institutions of power, I also believe all the more that the role of the president in both appointing and directing the government will increase.

[Szemplinska] Let us assume that the government will become the president's executive arm. This will not alter the fact that it has to reach an accommodation with the parliament, unless—which I do not believe—the parliament relinquishes a substantial part of its prerogatives for the sake of granting special powers to the Executive.

[Celinski] Here we arrive at the question of the quality of instruments of state power. I have repeatedly criticized the quality of performance of the Presidential Chancellery, because in a situation in which everything indicated that the Belweder would become the focus of executive power, the chancellery's staff either was unwilling or did not know how to cooperate with the parliament. And in a fragmented parliament gaining favorable reception for the president's intentions seems to be a highly important matter.

[Szemplinska] The other chancellery has become dissolved, but what next? The concept you advocate requires a certain vision of that office.

[Celinski] What is more the instruments for pursuing an efficient policy should be developed very rapidly. I am not sure whether Lech Walesa is ready for that. But the heart of the matter is that if the parliament is to be the legislative body and executive power is to gain identity by the fact of concentrating it at the Belweder, and if it is to be based on not only a vote of confidence in the parliament but also on smooth cooperation with efficiently performing coalitions formed to promote legislative proposals and rapid action, then the president must have efficient mediators for cooperation with the parliament, so that the parliament would be his partner rather than competitor, so that his work would not reduce to partisan political ploys and decisions promoting parochial interests.

[Szemplinska] In these respects Lech Walesa lacks a good starting point.

[Celinski] True, and not only because of the election results but also because of his characteristically unpredictable policies. Walesa has roiled the political scene and focused it on his own persona instead of on important national issues. That is why I say that, if he wants to be effective, he must build up his standing as a representative of Poland rather than of himself or of some partisan orientation. The more he is above political divisions, the stronger will executive power be and the more effective will democracy be. Bear in mind that Poland is the first country to be carrying out simultaneously a market reform and a political reform. The countries of the Far East, such as Taiwan, whose economic structure somewhat resembled that of Poland, built their market economy first and democracy later, which does not mean that Poles should first be held on short leash and then "freed," but still efficient and strong institutions of governance are indispensable.

[Szemplinska] Strong institutions of power also have to have public acceptance. The presidential system is favored by Center Accord and Liberal-Democratic Congress. Electoral Catholic Action and Confederation for an Independent Poland also lean toward this solution. But together they still do not form a parliamentary majority. Besides, do not you think that most parties will prefer to pursue their own partisan interests rather than cooperate with the Executive on behalf of a difficult and, as ever, unpopular program, even if that program is modified? The previous, 10th Sejm showed that politicking in the spirit of criticism or negation is much more frequent than building a consensus. This does not necessarily mean that the 11th Sejm will also be like that, but a bad political tradition has evolved in this respect.

[Celinski] I hope that now that the grounds for declarations instead of specific programs have disappeared, there is room for creating facts in, e.g., the institutions of

economic life, such as credit unions, incubators of entrepreneurship, financing instruments that assure the success of undertakings. I believe that real politics can be pursued.

[Szemplinska] It is difficult to dispute with a believer.

[Celinski] I won elections to the Sejm in a district in which Tyminski had previously won the elections to the presidency. I am a member of Democratic Union. I have not told fairy tales to anyone. I promised no miracles. I did not have the support of the Roman Catholic Church. I am merely trying to do something for my constituents. The largest number of votes in the elections to the Sejm was won by the current premier, who also is not prone to making facile promises. That is why I believe that the public can be reached by a concrete and realistic plan without resorting to deceit. But the practices of, e.g., Electoral Catholic Action, which resorts to lies as in the case of Deputy Stefan Niesiolowski, are not needed in order to operate successfully on the political scene. And I hope that President Lech Walesa will draw the correct conclusions from this.

[Szemplinska] Thank you for the interview.

Modzelewski Comments on Election Outcome

92EP0091B Warsaw *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC*
in Polish 8 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Senator Karol Modzelewski, leader of Labor Solidarity, by Wojciech Gielzynski; place and date not given: "The Greatest Disappointment"]

[Gielzynski] Who were the winners and the losers in the elections? What do the objective figures imply?

[Modzelewski] We have to begin with the winners. Theirs are relative successes, scored by only three groupings: the Alliance of the Democratic Left [SLD], the Electoral Catholic Action [WAK], and the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN]. On the opposite pole there is the total defeat of the Solidarity Left and the greatly stinging defeat of Solidarity itself. Likewise it is difficult to speak of any success of the Democratic Union [UD], which just barely held on to its position as the leading party, and of the Center Accord, although the latter scored somewhat better than in the preelection polls. The post-Solidarity camp found itself in an unusually difficult situation, the more so considering that the election results are burdened by the fact that nearly 60 percent of the voters stayed away from the polling stations. This is a blow to Polish democracy, but there is no reason—as after the previous blow, the success of Stan Tyminski—to once again wring one's hands about the electorate, the public.

[Gielzynski] Where then are the causes of the defeat to be found?

[Modzelewski] We should focus on the failure of the Polish political elites. It does not seem to me that Adam

Michnik was right in attributing this failure solely, or at least chiefly, to "the war at the top" [the dissension between Walesa and his previous principal supporters]. In my opinion, the principal cause of the defeat of the entire post-Solidarity camp—and of Polish democracy—is due to the economic policy pursued under Solidarity's emblem by two successive Administrations. As a result of this policy, which has pauperized and socially degraded the segments of the society which were the pillars of Solidarity (and which in its time Solidarity wanted to protect most), a large, and perhaps predominant number of Poles now view their experience with Solidarity as the greatest disappointment of their life. Most of the disappointed ones did not go out and vote, because no political party met their aspirations and reflected their stances.

[Gielzynski] Sometimes disappointment causes views to be turned around 180 degrees.

[Modzelewski] To the majority voting for the post-Communist Alliance of the Democratic Left was out of the question owing to strongly rooted anti-Communist feelings. Some, however, were not hindered by—or succeeded in overcoming—these emotions and voted for the SdRP [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland, the former Communist party]. It is characteristic that the SdRP became practically the only force representing the Leftist electorate in Poland. The defeat of the post-Solidarity Left shows that Solidarity symbolism is nowadays acceptable only to those segments of the society whose orientation may be termed center-right—those who had voted either for the UD or for the Center Accord, or for the Liberal-Democratic Congress (which besides cannot be unequivocally classified as belonging to the post-Solidarity camp).

[Gielzynski] How is the success of the [nationalist] KPN to be interpreted?

[Modzelewski] In my opinion, some voters perceived it as a party that is both anti-Communist and anti-Solidarity. That choice was more negative than programmatic, reflecting the disappointment felt with both these orientations. Lastly, the success of the Electoral Catholic Action was a goal of the Catholic Church but no great victory of the church. I believe that the church paid a very high price for the relative success of its protegee. Contrary to the previous declaration of the Episcopate the church as an institution intervened in the interparty struggle, risking its own authority, practically on behalf of precisely that party. This is a very serious blow to the previously unquestioned moral authority of the Roman Catholic Church. And it would still have been a blow even if the grouping or groupings supported by the church had won many more votes.

[Gielzynski] In the 1989 elections the church also was politically very active.

[Modzelewski] Yes, it had supported Solidarity, but those elections had involved not some interparty struggle but an anti-Communist national plebiscite. The situation now is different.

[Gielzynski] Why has NSZZ Solidarity suffered such a resounding defeat?

[Modzelewski] This defeat is, in my opinion, linked to the defeat of the Solidarity Left. Nowhere in the world does an electorate with rightist inclinations vote for a trade union. By acting as a political party, after the high price it had paid for acting as a protective screen for the antiworker policy of the last two Administrations, NSZZ Solidarity was bound to suffer this additional blow.

[Szemplinska] What should be done now to cut the losses?

[Modzelewski] The option represented by the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress lost out in the elections. Therefore, continuing the current orientation of the reform would verge on political adventurism. Even if a parliamentary majority could be gathered in favor of it, that would not represent a majority of the public. It seems to me that dreams of creating a government independent of the parliament and of the verdict of the society should not be cherished, and instead that verdict should be pondered and a compromise explored among the various groupings, including the peasant ones. Such a compromise would have to result in a marked revision of the exiting economic policy, which besides is something that the country needs.

[Gielzynski] What do you view as the principal danger?

[Modzelewski] Of course, the extensive voter absenteeism. People who have not voted will not feel represented by the new Sejm and by the democratic state, and they will seek to achieve their claims and demands through street violence and mob rule.

Commentary on Economic Condition Since 1989

92EP0061B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 25 Oct 91 p 11

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Economy After Shock"]

[Text] Economic indicators for the last two years do not present an unequivocal picture of the economy. The economic situation is characterized by variable results, differing even every month, as well as by divergent trends, and both permanent and temporary symptoms. Statistics do not offer a definite answer to the question: Are we getting deeper into recession, or have we passed the critical point after which we should be on a rebound.

The opening up of the economy, hard financial conditions which the stabilization program has brought, and exposing industry to free market effects caused a shock which brought setbacks in almost all branches of production. To give an example, in a period of nine months in

1989 coal mining level was at 136.3 million tonnes, while in a similar period of 1991 only at 105.6 million tonnes. The production of raw steel in the same period decreased from 11.6 to 8.3 million tonnes, the production of tractors dropped from 36,900 to 15,300 the production of lime nitrogen fell from 1,234,000 tonnes to 931,000 tonnes, that of television sets from 554,300 to 335,000.

Investment amounts also decreased. During the first three quarters of this year, investment expenditures were lower by 11 percent, compared to an analogous period of last year, while already last year's investments had a drop of 10 percent.

Where can we see upward trends? Well, we continue to see growth in the number of economic entities, especially in the private sector. In the years 1989-91, their number increased from 11,807 to 44,226. The number of joint venture companies grew from 410 to 3,512. The private sector's share in investment expenditures, however, was lower for the first half of this year than last year, dropping from 41.3 to 40.4 percent.

Forecast of Economic Policy Presented

92EP0092A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 7 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by Ewa Zychowicz: "Economic Policy in 1992: New and Old"]

[Text] Work is continuing on forming a new government, and initial information from the Belweder [Polish presidential residence] indicates that it will not take much longer. However, it is the duty of the old government—until the new one is formed—to continue the ongoing legislative and organizational work. The more so considering that the new year is coming and the participants in economic life would like by now to know what is awaiting them in a couple of months. Work at the ministries is continuing, and the assumptions of the socioeconomic policy are being drafted. But the drafts continue to be revised, and it is not easy either to tell whether they will be accepted by the new government once it is formed. At any rate it is better to know something than nothing.

At the threshold of the new year 1992 the principal aspects of the economic strategy may be tentatively defined. It should be intended to halt the recession while at the same time promoting the factors stabilizing the economy: improve the domestic market, maintain the trend toward a decline in inflation, promote convertibility of the zloty, and preserve a safe level of foreign [currency] reserves. The recession can be overcome only in a situation promoting a more efficient management of the existing resources and stimulating their rational augmentation.

The following factors should serve in 1992 to meet these conditions.

Privatization of Enterprises

The pace of privatization should be more rapid than in the last two years, owing to the organizational preparations and new approaches. A major obstacle to privatization is the unsettled ownership conditions, and hence a quick legislative settlement of the scope and forms of privatization is needed, along with the ordering and complementation of the land and property records of components of state and communal property and the completion of legislative work on issues of trading in land and natural resources.

The work on an integral program defining the approximate schedule and forms of privatization of the principal groups of enterprises and economic sectors should be completed. The formulation of concepts of privatization has resulted in the formation of an organizational machinery consisting of the Ministry of Ownership Transformation, corresponding departments in the parent agencies of enterprises, banks, and consulting firms [and this machinery should serve to draft and implement that integral program].

As a more radical solution, the Ministry of Ownership Transformation, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and the Central Planning Office should be merged into a single Ministry of the Economy and Ownership Transformation.

This solution would involve extensive reorganization and the risk of disturbances in the functioning of economic administration. Therefore, an alternative solution, based on leaving the old structures intact but improving the cooperation between the Ministry of Ownership Transformations and the parent agencies of enterprises by, e.g., creating privatization taskforces and endowing them with the power to decide on dissolving enterprises by virtue of the Law on State Enterprises, should be considered.

In 1992 the decentralization of the process of privatization through liquidation [of enterprises], commenced this year, will bear fruit in the form of the appointment of special commissions. In addition, there exist proposals to modify this approach to privatization by having the State Treasury act as a partner in the companies thus formed. The work on a program for nationwide privatization will be continued. It is expected to be introduced in two stages. The first stage will be the formation of Administrations of National Property, which will be charged with administering stock in selected enterprises. The second stage will be an approach to "proprietizing" citizens [by issuing them stock certificates]; this issue will have to be resolved by the parliament.

The new solutions for a rapid privatization are principally:

- Accelerated privatization of management while at the same time leaving the majority share in the hands of the State Treasury for the transition period. This

solution would consist in limiting the proxy rights of the majority shareholder by utilizing Article 404 of the Commercial Code.

- Formation of industry and commerce group centers from selected foreign trade agencies. The concept of this kind of holding company is being worked out.

Changes in the Banking System

In 1992 the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Poland will together work out the draft of a new banking law. A bank deposit insurance system will be established. In the first half of the new year the next banks to undergo privatization will be chosen. The Food Industry Bank will become a regular credit union, while retaining its leading role in financing agriculture. A decision will also be taken as regards transforming the PKO Bank. The Export Promotion Bank will be privatized.

The changes in the banking system will contribute to more efficient credit procedures. This will be influenced by the privatization of banks and the monitoring of state banks by supervising councils, along with the formation of an interbank database on bank clients and the introduction of new standards for evaluating the creditworthiness of customers.

By the end of February 1992 state banks shall reclassify loans in terms of creditworthiness and borrowers into those who will benefit from help and those who must be placed in receivership. They also are drafting proposals for isolating relatively illiquid assets from bank balance sheets.

Changes in the Insurance System

Insurance oversight will be strengthened by introducing, among other things, supervision by the minister of finance over trading in large blocks of shares in insurance companies. The Polish Insurance Society will be established, with the majority share therein to be held by the State Treasury. Organizational and ownership changes will take place in the PZU [State Social Security Administration] and Warta insurance establishments. The PZU will be transformed into a Treasury-owned joint-stock company and broken up into three establishments of which one will handle life insurance and two property and personal insurance. A law on insurance agencies defining the guidelines for the operations of insurance agents and brokers will be developed.

Changes in the Guidelines for Handling State Enterprises

An accelerated commercialization, i.e., conversion to joint-stock companies, of larger enterprises will take place. The management and workforce would have the right to receive gratis 10 percent of shares in an enterprise once it becomes thus privatized. It is proposed that the mandatory payments to the state budget by state enterprises and the charging of interest on the capital be

replaced with a surcharge, payable to the state budget, on the payments of wages out of profits. A condition for the effectiveness of this approach is that a correspondingly effective tax on wage increases, debited to the operating cost, be retained.

An alternative solution would be for these enterprises to continue their regular payments to the state budget while at the same time exempting from the tax on wage increases those enterprises which fulfill on schedule their obligations toward the state budget and creditors and do not reduce the ratio of profits to wages, or at which exports account for a high share of overall sales.

It is necessary to maintain a demanding attitude toward state enterprises, subject them to the needful competition, and expose them to firm financial contingencies, i.e., to avoid subsidizing them or providing them with loan guarantees from the state budget, and to refrain from forcing the banks to make loans to money-losing enterprises with hopeless prospects. The enterprises operating at a loss owing to particularly substantial payments to the state budget will be able to obtain a reduction in these payments on condition that they conclude with their parent agencies a contract guaranteeing that the savings thus achieved will be spent on modernization rather than on wage increases.

The New Housing Policy

The home mortgage system, combined with a system whereby the state budget would redeem part of the debts owed the banks in the form of interest on mortgages, would become widespread. The savings and loan system for housing-seekers will be expanded, and interested foreign companies will be admitted to the housing market. The system of tax exemptions for housing builders, buyers, and renovators will be continued. It is expected that some rental housing will be privatized and guidelines for rent payments such as would completely offset the operating and maintenance costs of buildings, will be introduced.

New Regional Policy

Funds will be allocated for the state budget to participate in the capitalization of infrastructural projects needed for the economic restructuring of discrete regions. Incentives for establishing new businesses, especially for investing in regions which are particularly threatened by recession and unemployment, will be applied.

Overview of Harvest Completion Noted

92EP0061A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 28 Oct 91 p 11

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Final Spurt for Fall Farm Work: Farmer Does Not Heed Pessimists"]

[Text] Traveling from the south northward and from the west eastward, one can see relatively plenty of unploughed soil. Most people conclude that some farmers gave up growing winter grains and left their fields fallow. Experts are of a different opinion.

"This fall farmers cultivated about 4,900,000 hectares of grains, which is more or less what they grow every year," assures Franciszek Blok, director of the Vegetable Production Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. "Only proportions among various kinds of grain to be cultivated may change. Probably, smaller amounts of rye and wheatrye will be grown, and greater amounts of wheat and barley. This means that the trend which has existed for several years now will continue."

Rape is seeded first. This year farmers put about 450,000 hectares into this grain, which is only slightly less than last year (470,000 hectares). They put about 2,250 thousand hectares, according to director Blok, into rye (2,290,000 hectares last year), and for wheat they reserved 2,500,000-2,550,000 hectares (2,450,000 hectares last year). The acreage of wheatrye will be smaller (this year it was collected from 730,000 hectares). In spring we may expect smaller allotments to potato and oats cultivation. The acreage of potato growing this year was already smaller by 100,000 hectares. Oats cultivation has dropped because of a continuous decrease in horse population. In the case of potato growing, the anticipated export to our eastern neighbors may have a stabilizing effect on it.

Farm work is slowly approaching completion. The worst laggards are seeding the last plots with grains and digging the last potatoes. A small percentage of sugar beets remains to be collected, together with the last corn kept for seeds and some vegetables. This year's crops have not been affected yet by the clearly decreased fertilization of soil. Director Blok, who believes that this year the use of fertilizers is even lower, hopes that it will not yet affect significantly crop yields next year.

"We may still collect as much as 30 quintals of grains per hectare," he says, "but in two or three years we may have a virtually tragic situation."

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